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The Use of Technical Experts in Software Copyright Cases:
Rectifying the Ninth Circuit’s “Nutty” Rule
Shyamkrishna Balganesh † & Peter S. Menell

††

Abstract
Courts have long been skeptical about the use of expert witnesses in copyright cases. More
than four decades ago, and before Congress extended copyright law to protect computer software,
the Ninth Circuit in Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., ruled that expert testimony
was inadmissible to determine whether Mayor McCheese and the merry band of McDonaldland
characters infringed copyright protection for Wilhelmina W. Witchiepoo and the other imaginative
H.R. Pufnstuf costumed characters. Since the emergence of software copyright infringement cases
in the 1980s, substantially all software copyright cases have permitted expert witnesses to aid juries
in understanding software code. As the Second Circuit recognized in Computer Associates Int’l,
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., the ordinary observer standard may well have served its purpose when the
material under scrutiny was limited to art forms readily comprehensible and generally familiar to
the average lay person,” but as to computer programs, district courts must have “discretion . . . to
decide to what extent, if any, expert opinion, regarding the highly technical nature of computer
programs, is warranted in a given case.”
In a shocking departure from the decisions of every other circuit that has confronted software
copyright infringement litigation, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed and applied the bar on expert
testimony originating in Krofft Television Prods. to all copyright disputes, including those
involving highly technical computer software code. The court in Antonick v. Electronic Arts held
that lay juries must decipher and analyze software code—distinct hexadecimal assembly code
languages for different processors—without the assistance of expert witnesses, a rule that the
authoring judge characterized at the oral argument as “nutty.”
The Ninth Circuit’s rule overlooks the key distinction between the use of technical experts to
analyze substantial similarity as opposed to enabling lay judges and jurors to perceive the
underlying works. Just as it would be absurd to ask a lay jury with no familiarity with Kanji
characters to assess whether a translation of HARRY POTTER AND THE PHILOSOPHER’S STONE into
Japanese infringed the English original without the aid of a bilingual translator, it makes no sense
to ask a non-technical jury to compare computer source codes written in different assembly
languages to determine substantial similarity without expert assistance. We contend, consistent
with the views of every court outside of the Ninth Circuit that has addressed the issue, that courts
should permit the use of technical experts to enable lay judges and juries to perceive the meaning
of computer languages and computer code.
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††

Copyright law has long relied on the views of lay audiences to assess the critical infringement
question: whether the defendant’s work is substantially similar to protected elements of the
plaintiff’s work of authorship. The 7th Amendment right to a jury trial reinforces lay juries’ role in
resolving copyright cases. For much of the U.S. history, lay jurors were capable of comparing
literary and artistic works through direct observation of the manuscripts, pictures, and sculptures.
Copyright law achieved a democratic character. Subject to the jury instructions regarding the
contours of the law, a diverse group of lay people assess infringement if either party so requests.
Consequently, courts have long been skeptical about the use of expert witnesses in copyright
cases. Courts have long allowed experts to assist in the objective assessment of which aspects of
the copyrighted work are protectable, but prohibited experts to assist the fact finder in comparing
the works in question to determine substantial similarity of protected expression—the subjective
or intrinsic inquiry. With the extension of copyright protection to computer software, however, the
Second Circuit recognized that while “the ordinary observer standard may well have served its
purpose when the material under scrutiny was limited to art forms readily comprehensible and
generally familiar to the average lay person,” district courts must have “discretion . . . to decide to
what extent, if any, expert opinion, regarding the highly technical nature of computer programs, is
warranted in a given case.” 1 Most other circuits to confront software copyright cases came to the
same conclusion. 2
In a shocking departure from the decisions of every other circuit that has confronted software
copyright infringement litigation, the Ninth Circuit has continued to bar expert testimony on the
intrinsic test in cases involving highly technical computer software code. It held in Antonick v.
Electronic Arts that lay juries must decipher and analyze software code—distinct hexadecimal 3
†

Professor of Law; Co-Director, Center for Technology, Innovation & Competition, University of Pennsylvania
Law School.
††
Koret Professor of Law; Director, Berkeley Center for Law & Technology; Faculty Director, Berkeley Judicial
Institute; University of California at Berkeley School of Law. Professor Menell served as counsel in the appeal and
certiorari petition in Antonick v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 841 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 422
(2017).
1

See Computer Associates Intern., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713 (2d Cir. 1992).

2

See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 834-35 (10th Cir. 1993).

3

Hexadecimal provides a convenient way of representing binary information, which is very important for
computer systems. Computer systems store information in arrays of on/off switches. Thus, the basic unit of
information in computer systems is a binary digit (“0” or “1”) or “bit.” See Bit, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bit.
Hexidecimal features a base of 16 symbols (“0” –“9”, “A”-“F”) as opposed to the more common decimal (“0”-“9”)
system. See Hexidecimal, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hexadecimal. Hence, hexadecimal symbols
provide a human-friendly representation of binary-coded values. Each hexadecimal digit represents four binary digits,
also known as a nibble, which is half a byte. A “byte” is a unit of digital information that most commonly consists of
eight bits. See Byte, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Byte. Historically, the byte was the number of bits used to encode
a single character of text in a computer and for this reason was the smallest addressable unit of memory in many
computer architectures. For example, a single byte can have values ranging from 00000000 to 11111111 in binary
form, which can be conveniently represented as 00 to FF in hexadecimal.
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assembly code languages for different processors—without the assistance of expert witnesses, a
rule that the authoring judge characterized at the oral argument at “nutty.”
This article explores the role of technical experts in copyright cases. Part I traces the history of
expert witness skepticism in copyright infringement analysis. Part II discusses the departure from
that skepticism in software copyright cases in most circuit courts. Part III surveys the Ninth
Circuit’s unusual infringement jurisprudence. Part IV then examines Antonick v. Electronic Arts,
which prohibited the use of expert witness testimony to assist a jury deciphering complex computer
languages. Part V contends the time is long overdue for the Ninth Circuit, home to much of the
computer software industry, to join the chorus of other circuits that allow expert witnesses to assist
juries in perceiving complex computer programs.
I. The Historical Roots of Expert Witness Skepticism
The earliest use of expert testimony in adversarial common law litigation is usually traced back
to 1782 and the famed decision of Folkes v. Chadd handed down by Chief Justice Mansfield. 4
Scholars have long regarded this case as having developed the “foundation” for the rules governing
expert witnesses. 5 Folkes was a property dispute and the witnesses involved in the case were
primarily engineers. In permitting the court to receive their testimony, Justice Mansfield developed
the position that the opinions of experts, “when formed on facts was very proper evidence.” 6 Even
though Folkes was not a copyright case, Justice Mansfield’s role in it is noteworthy given his
prominence at the time, especially in the world of copyright law. 7
By the turn of the nineteenth century, it appears to have become fairly common for litigants in
English music copyright cases to present the court with the testimony of experts. The 1835 decision
in D’Almaine v. Boosey is a perfect example. 8 The facts involved an operatic composition assigned
to the plaintiff, which the defendant had copied and published but with some significant
substantive embellishments. 9 Among other arguments, the defendant claimed that these
embellishments rendered his work an altogether different one and thus his publication nonpiratical. 10 In support of their claims, both the plaintiff and defendant relied on affidavits from
“experienced musician[s]”, which the court accepted as entirely unproblematic. 11 Perhaps more
importantly, in finding for the plaintiff the court itself relief on a prior (unnamed) decision dealing
with musical compositions, and made a point of noting how that prior decision was significant
because it was based on the views of the famed musician and composer “Sir George Smart, who
was a witness in the case.” 12

4

99 Eng. Rep. 589 (1782).

5

See, e.g., Tal Golan, Revisiting the History of Scientific Expert Testimony, 73 Brooklyn L. Rev. 879, 887 (2008).

6

99 Eng. Rep. at 590.

7

Judge Mansfield had in 1769 decided the celebrated case of Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 291 (1769).

8

160 Eng. Rep. 117 (1835).

9

Id. at 118-21.

10

Id. at 122.

11

Id. at 118, 119.

12

Id. at 123.
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It remains unclear when U.S. courts developed a regularized sense of comfort with expert
testimony in copyright matters. What we do know is that they seem to have largely followed the
English model of allowing experts in cases involving musical compositions. The English case of
D’Almaine came to be adopted and followed in short order by a notable case: Jollie v. Jacques.13
A decision of the federal district court in New York, the case involved a matter largely similar to
D’Almaine and the court was called upon to examine whether the defendant’s work was an
infringement of the plaintiff’s despite having added multiple variations. 14 Relying on the English
precedent, the court denied the plaintiff’s request for an injunction. Important for us though is the
fact that in support of its argument the defendant present the testimony of “an expert, who had
examined and compared the two pieces of music”. 15 The court accepted this testimony as
uncontroversial, in almost identical manner as the court had in D’Almaine.
A similar approach was adopted by a federal district court a few years prior to Jollie. In
Reed v. Carusi, 16 an infringement action brought in the district court of Maryland, the plaintiff
alleged an infringement of the copyright in its ballad, a musical composition. As part of its
unsuccessful defense, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff’s work was itself drawn from a prior
source—and to support this claim introduced “the testimony of various experts in music,” which
was delivered to the jury without any documented controversy. 17
Neither of the two leading copyright treatises from the nineteenth century—Curtis on
Copyright and Drone on Copyright—however address the issue directly. 18 All the same, neither
expresses any disagreement with the English cases that rely on the affidavits of experts, or with
the U.S. cases that adopt a similar approach.
Drone, in particular, spends a good amount of time describing the test for “piracy”, i.e.,
copyright infringement, where the use of experts is today a matter of controversy. Recognizing
that the comparison of the works is usually a laborious and time-intensive process that entails a
complex analysis of the two works, Drone notes how “[i]n the United States, the usual practice in
cases involving much labor has been to make a reference to a master.” 19 He further notes that the
“master may be required not only to report the facts, but also to give his opinion as to whether the
plaintiff’s work is original, and whether it has been infringed by the defendant.” 20 While this
account tracks the modern practice of a court-appointed expert/master, it is nevertheless telling in
two respects. First, it involves the court—rather than the parties—directly relying on the master.
And second, the rationale, in Drone’s view, for such reliance was not expertise over subject-matter
but rather the labor and time involved in undertaking a scrutiny and comparison of the works,
13

13 F. Cas. 910 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850). For an excellent discussion of the substantive issue involved in both
D’Almaine and Jollie, see: Joseph P. Fishman, Music as a Matter of Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1861, 1877-79 (2018).
14

Id. at 913-14.

15

Id. at 913.

16

20 F. Cas. 431 (C.C.D. Md. 1845).

17

Id. at 431.

18

See generally EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS
(1879); GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT (1847).
19

DRONE, supra note 18, at 513.

20

Id. at 514.
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which was seemingly unworthy of the court’s attention at the time. What this suggests is that
nineteenth century U.S. copyright law was hardly seen—by treatise-writers and perhaps courts as
well—as requiring specific expertise beyond knowledge of the doctrine and the standard legal
principles and methods of argumentation and reasoning commonly deployed. A comparison of the
works—however complex—was a matter of perception, which required little more than time and
patience and was entirely a question of fact and judgment internal to a court’s ordinary role.
To the extent that such expertise was required/allowed, it seems to have been relegated to the
domain of music. This trend continued through the nineteenth century and into the early part of
the twentieth century. The developmental jurisprudence around the law relating to infringement of
musical works routinely contains references to expert reports, testimony and affidavits presented
to courts for proof of copying. 21 And while courts for the most part relied on the notion of the
“average ear”, they nevertheless appear to have somewhat routinely allowed expert opinions to
influence their views on originality and copying.
As copyright litigation matured, savvy litigants and their lawyers attempted to cloak
perceptibility with the need for expertise that was well beyond something ordinarily possessed by
a judge. In so doing, they implicitly pushed the idea that courts should make use of expert witnesses
with knowledge of the subject-matter at issue in the lawsuit, a claim that went well beyond music.
In the late 1920s, Moses Malevinsky, counsel to Anne Nichols in the seminal case of Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp., 22 sought to offer his own scientific theory as the basis for assessing
similarity of dramatic works, a theory which he had published as a freestanding monograph at the
time of the litigation. 23 While acknowledging Malevinsky’s “deep study of the technical
construction of plays and motion pictures,” District Judge Henry Goddard concluded that
Malevinsky’s theory called for a “new test, or at least a new method of approach” that
impermissibly would extend protection to ideas. 24 On appeal, Judge Learned Hand was especially
skeptical of the use of experts to aid the court in judging copyright infringement:
We cannot approve the length of the record, which was due chiefly to the use of expert
witnesses. Argument is argument whether in the box or at the bar, and its proper place is
the last. The testimony of an expert upon such issues, especially his cross-examination,
greatly extends the trial and contributes nothing which cannot be better heard after the
evidence is all submitted. It ought not to be allowed at all; and while its admission is not a
ground for reversal, it cumbers the case and tends to confusion, for the more the court is
led into the intricacies of dramatic craftsmanship, the less likely it is to stand upon the
firmer, if more naive, ground of its considered impressions upon its own perusal. We hope
that in this class of cases such evidence may in the future be entirely excluded, and the case

21

For a general overview, see: Paul W. Orth, The Use of Expert Witnesses in Musical Infringement Cases, 16 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 232 (1955).
22

34 F.2d 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), aff’d, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).

23
See MOSES MALEVINSKY, THE SCIENCE OF PLAYWRITING (1925); see generally MARK ROSE, AUTHORS IN
COURT: SCENES FROM THE THEATER OF COPYRIGHT 98-103 (2016) (discussing Malevinsky’s unusual trial strategy,
which included himself testifying for seven days).
24

Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 34 F.2d 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
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confined to the actual issues; that is, whether the defendant copied it, so far as the supposed
infringement is identical. 25
The modern formulation of copyright infringement analysis emerged 16 years later in the
Second Circuit. Ira Arnstein, a litigious and prolific but largely unknown composer, alleged that
four of famed composer Cole Porter’s popular compositions infringed multiple Arnstein
compositions. 26 Porter denied ever hearing Arnstein’s composition. The case unfolded shortly after
the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which played a significant role in the
formulation of the modern infringement framework.
Arnstein set forth a two-part test focused on what became known as “illicit” copying. As
formulated then, the plaintiff had to prove “(a) that defendant copied from plaintiff’s copyrighted
work and (b) that the copying (assuming it to be proved) went too far as to constitute improper
appropriation.” 27 The first prong allowed expert testimony. “On this issue, analysis (‘dissection’)
is relevant, and the testimony of experts may be received to aid the trier of the facts.” 28 The second
prong required proof of “illicit copying (unlawful appropriation).” 29 Judge Jerome Frank declared
that “the test is the response of the ordinary lay hearer; accordingly, on that issue, ‘dissection’ and
expert testimony are irrelevant.” 30 Frank’s reasons for the categorical rejection of expert testimony
on this second question remain perplexing, and appear to have been motivated more by the unique
interpersonal interaction between the judges on the panel than any rational belief in the value of
experts. 31 Nevertheless, it found its way into the majority’s opinion.
The Arnstein court, however, did not altogether preclude the use of expert testimony during
the actual comparison of the two works, even where the issue was to be determined by a jury. To
the contrary, the court emphasized that expert testimony (there from trained musicians) could
instead perform an important role to aid the fact-finder in assessing the responses of the intended
audience (music listeners) for the work. 32 The court explicitly determined that use of expert
testimony may be appropriate in aiding the fact-finder even under the second prong. 33 Its only
forewarning was that such expertise not become “controlling” on the question, but instead an aid
to the decision-maker. 34
The Arnstein framework was developed against the backdrop of a deep skepticism towards
courts’ reliance on summary judgment to decide the question of infringement. In the many years
25

Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930).

26

See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1946); see generally GARY A. ROSEN, UNFAIR TO GENIUS:
THE STRANGE AND LITIGIOUS CAREER OF IRA B. ARNSTEIN (2012).
27

154 F.2d at 468.

28

Id.

29

Id.

30

Id.

31
See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Questionable Origins of the Copyright Infringement Analysis, 68 Stan. L.
Rev. 791, 832-37 (2016)
32

Arnstein, 154 F. 2d at 473.

33

Id.

34

Id.
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since the decision, much has changed on that front. 35 Not only has the standard for summary
judgment as articulated in Arnstein come to be significantly overhauled, but courts’ very resort to
summary judgment is now actively encouraged in the jurisprudence. 36 Despite this reality, courts
around the country continue to rely on Judge Frank’s two-step formulation.
The modern reliance on summary judgment to decide infringement has further complicated the
two-part test formulated in Arnstein, which was designed for use principally in trials. With courts
in most jurisdictions able to decide both steps of the test on a motion for summary judgement, the
prohibition on expert testimony to aid the second step is often rendered functionally moot. Since
they make use of such testimony on the first step, the prohibition on using it for the second merely
translates into courts avoiding a complete (or “determinative”) reliance on such testimony in their
decision on the second prong. Nevertheless, to the extent that infringement cases proceed to trial—
either a bench trial or with a jury—the prohibition on expert testimony on the second prong remains
widespread. And here the unfortunate reality remains that even though Arnstein did not altogether
preclude expert testimony on the second prong but merely prohibited treating it as determinative,
the Ninth Circuit, as we shall see, has treated the rule as a firm prohibition.
II. Computer Software Cases: An Exception to the Traditional Rule Limiting Expert
Testimony
As the computer software marketplace emerged in the early 1970s, Congress included
computer software within the scope of “literary works” in the Copyright Act of 1976. 37 In view of
the technological complexity of computer software—entailing unusual and technical computer
languages that are unfamiliar to lay judges and juries 38—courts came to see that expert testimony
would be necessary to perceive the similarity of computer programs. In Whelan Assocs., Inc. v.
Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 39 the Third Circuit recognized that the Arnstein limitation on the use of
expert witnesses in the subjective stage of the infringement analysis did not make sense in
computer software cases:
The ordinary observer test, which was developed in cases involving novels, plays, and
paintings, and which does not permit expert testimony, is of doubtful value in cases
involving computer programs on account of the programs’ complexity and unfamiliarity to
35

Balganesh, supra note 31, at 852-53.

36

Id.

37

The Act includes “literary works” within the class of “works of authorship.” See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). The
House Report explains that “[t]he term ‘literary works’ does not connote any criterion of literary merit or qualitative
value: it includes catalogs, directories, and similar factual, reference, or instructional works and compilations of data.
It also includes computer data bases, and computer programs to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the
programmer’s expression of original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at
53–54 (1976) (emphasis added). Other provisions of the 1976 Act, however, maintained traditional exclusions for
ideas and functional features, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), and Congress added additional safeguards against overbroad
protection in 1980, Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3007, 3028 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§
101, 117) (adopting recommendations of the NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL
REPORT 1 (1979)). See Peter S. Menell, Rise of the API Copyright Dead?: An Updated Epitaph for Copyright
Protection of Network and Functional Features of Computer Software, 31 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 305, 315-18 (2018).
38

See Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 1045, 1051-57 (1989).
39

797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
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most members of the public. See Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A
Modification of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN.L.REV. 1264, 1285–88 (1984).
Cf. Note, Copyright Infringement Actions: The Proper Role for Audience Reactions in
Determining Substantial Similarity, 54 S.CAL.L.REV. 385 (1981) (criticizing lay observer
standard when objects in question are intended for particular, identifiable audiences).
Moreover, the distinction between the two parts of the Arnstein test may be of doubtful
value when the finder of fact is the same person for each step: that person has been exposed
to expert evidence in the first step, yet she or he is supposed to ignore or “forget” that
evidence in analyzing the problem under the second step. Especially in complex cases, we
doubt that the “forgetting” can be effective when the expert testimony is essential to even
the most fundamental understanding of the objects in question.
On account of these problems with the standard, we believe that the ordinary observer
test is not useful and is potentially misleading when the subjects of the copyright are
particularly complex, such as computer programs. We therefore join the growing number
of courts which do not apply the ordinary observer test in copyright cases involving
exceptionally difficult materials, like computer programs, but instead adopt a single
substantial similarity inquiry according to which both lay and expert testimony would be
admissible. See E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp., 623 F.Supp. 1485, 1493
(D.Minn.1985); Hubco Data Products Corp. v. Management Assistance Inc., 2 Copyright
L.Rep. (CCH) ¶ 25,529 (D.Idaho Feb. 3, 1983) (enunciating bifurcated test, but relying
entirely on expert testimony); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F.Supp. 741, 752–53
(N.D.Ill.1983) (relying entirely on expert testimony to find substantial similarity); see also
Fed.R.Evid. 702 (“If [expert testimony] will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness . . . may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.”). 40
In the landmark Altai case, the Second Circuit distinguished Arnstein and held that the
prohibition on expert testimony was inapplicable to comparisons of computer software under the
second prong because “we cannot disregard the highly complicated and technical subject matter
at the heart of these claims.” 41 The court observed that “computer programs are likely to be
somewhat impenetrable by lay observers—whether they be judges or juries—and, thus, seem to
fall outside the category of works contemplated by those who engineered the Arnstein test.” 42
Consequently, the Altai court concluded that “on substantial similarity with respect to computer
programs, we believe that the trier of fact need not be limited by the strictures of its own lay
perspective” and it was at “the discretion of the district court to decide to what extent, if any, expert
opinion, regarding the highly technical nature of computer programs, is warranted in a given

40

Id. at 1232-33. While we agree with the Whelan court’s determination that software experts ought to be
permitted to aid law judges and juries in perceiving the works at issue in computer software cases, we question the
manner in which the Whelan court applied copyright’s limiting doctrines. See Menell, supra note __, at 1074.
41

Computer Associates Intern., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d at 713.

42

Id.
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case.” 43 The Altai decision expressly permits expert testimony at the discretion of the district
court. 44
Other courts followed the Second Circuit’s lead. The Tenth Circuit has “[i]n substantial part .
. . adopt[ed]” the Altai test in Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd. 45 Although Gates
Rubber did not explicitly address expert testimony at all stages of the test, Altai allows such
testimony, and the Gates Rubber court endorsed use of experts in at least some of the inquiry. 46
The Fifth Circuit has also adopted the Altai test, although it did not explicitly address the use of
experts to aid comparison. 47
Three other circuits have approved the use of expert testimony to evaluate substantial similarity
in cases involving difficult or complex works other than software. The Fourth Circuit firmly
rejected the approach of refusing to permit expert testimony in a music case, noting that “only a
reckless indifference to common sense would lead a court to embrace a doctrine that requires a
copyright case to turn on the opinion of someone who is ignorant of the relevant differences and
similarities between two works.” 48 The court replaced the “ordinary observer” with the “intended
audience” of the work, and permitted the fact-finder may rely on expert testimony. 49 The Dawson
court noted that the trend towards allowing expert testimony for complex subject matter was forced
by “the advent of computer programming infringement actions.” 50
The Sixth Circuit addressed the use of experts in a case alleging copyright infringement of
technical patent drawings. 51 Its two-step test contemplates use of expert testimony; in its second
step, “the trier of fact should make the substantial similarity determination from the perspective of
the intended audience. Expert testimony will usually be necessary to educate the trier of fact in
those elements for which the specialist will look.” 52
Although the First Circuit uses a traditional “ordinary observer” test, it recognized in a case
involving architectural works that “the need for expert testimony may be greater in cases involving
complex subject matters where an ordinary observer may find it difficult to properly evaluate the

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 1993).

46

Id. at 834-35 (“in most cases we foresee that the use of experts will provide substantial guidance to the court
in applying an abstractions test”) (emphasis added).
47

See Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1342 (5th Cir. 1994), opinion
supplemented on denial of reh’g, 46 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1995).
48

Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 735 (4th Cir. 1990).

49

Id. at 736 (“When conducting the second prong of the substantial similarity inquiry, a district court must
consider the nature of the intended audience of the plaintiff's work. . . . Such an inquiry may include, and no doubt in
many cases will require, admission of testimony from members of the intended audience or, possibly, from those who
possess expertise with reference to the tastes and perceptions of the intended audience.”).
50

Id. at 736.

51

See Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848 (6th Cir. 2003).

52

Id. at 857 (emphasis added).
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similarity of two works without the aid of expert testimony.” 53 The D.C. Circuit has noted the
trend of allowing expert testimony for comparison of complex works like software, though without
explicitly addressing the issue. 54
III. The Unwitting Origin of the Ninth Circuit’s “Nutty” Rule: Krofft Television Prods., Inc.
v. McDonald’s Corp.
Even though Arnstein was decided under a now-overruled standard for summary judgment, 55
it remains influential. And unfortunately, so does the misunderstanding of its views on the use of
expert testimony. Nowhere is this more prominent than in the Ninth Circuit, which purported to
develop its own two-part test based on Arnstein.
In Krofft, the Ninth Circuit was called upon to develop an approach to the infringement analysis
that recognized copyrightable works to embody both protected and unprotected elements. 56 In
recognizing therefore that protectability was a seemingly objective enterprise that entailed
analyzing components of a work against a set of objective principles—such as originality, the ideaexpression dichotomy, scenes-a-faire, and the like—the court adopted a two part formulation 57:
The test for infringement therefore has been given a new dimension. There must be
ownership of the copyright and access to the copyrighted work. But there also must be
substantial similarity not only of the general ideas but of the expressions of those ideas as
well. Thus two steps in the analytic process are implied by the requirement of substantial
similarity. . . .
We shall call this the ‘extrinsic test.’ It is extrinsic because it depends not on the
responses of the trier of fact, but on specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed. Such
criteria include the type of artwork involved, the materials used, the subject matter, and the
setting for the subject. Since it is an extrinsic test, analytic dissection and expert testimony
are appropriate. Moreover, this question may often be decided as a matter of law. . . .
The test to be applied in determining whether there is substantial similarity in
expressions shall be labeled an intrinsic one — depending on the response of the ordinary
reasonable person. . . .
53
T-Peg, Inc. v. Vermont Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 116 (1st Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). It then explicitly
“le[ft] to the district court the determination of whether this may be a case in which expert testimony would be helpful
on the issue of substantial similarity.” Id. at 116 (reversing the district court’s decision in part for rejecting expert
testimony on substantial similarity). Although T-Peg endorses a rule that allows use of experts in some circumstances,
at least one later First Circuit opinion indicates that the issue is not fully settled. See Airframe Sys., Inc. v. L-3
Commc’ns Corp., 658 F.3d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Where, as here, the copyrighted work involves specialized
subject matter such as a computer program, some courts have held that the ‘ordinary observer’ is a member of the
work’s ‘intended audience’ who possesses ‘specialized expertise.’ . . . This court has yet to directly address this issue,
and it is unnecessary to do so here.”) (citing Dawson, Kohus, Altai, and Whelan) (additional citations omitted).
54

See Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1300-01 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that “[a] growing
number of courts now permit expert testimony regarding substantial similarity in cases involving computer programs,
reasoning that such testimony is needed due to the complexity and unfamiliarity of computer programs to most
members of the public” and remanding for further development) (quotation omitted).
55

See Balganesh, supra note 31, at 852-55.

56

Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F. 2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).

57

Id. at 1164.
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This same type of bifurcated test was announced in Arnstein. . . . We believe that the
court in Arnstein was alluding to the idea-expression dichotomy which we make explicit
today.
In developing its own two-part formulation, Krofft fundamentally misunderstood the analytical
basis and rationale behind the Arnstein test and its rules about expert testimony. Appreciating this
misunderstanding requires delving a little bit deeper into the Arnstein test and the analytical basis
of its rules.
To begin with the basics, the first step in the Arnstein formulation—the question of factual
copying—is an entirely evidentiary question. Indeed, it is for this reason that some have referred
to this step as the question of “probative similarity,” to the extent that it relies on a comparison of
the two works in order to infer such copying. 58 Yet, the examination is not simply of whether the
defendant copied from the plaintiff’s work tout court. Instead it asks whether the defendant copied
protectable expression from the plaintiff’s work. And this is because, as a corollary of the
fundamental precept of copyright law that not all copying is infringement, that all works contain
both protectable and unprotectable elements. 59 Indeed, this part of the test is meant to weed out
the possibility that the plaintiff and defendant both drew from a common source, or from materials
in the public domain, or indeed from altogether unprotected materials such as ideas or unoriginal
expression. It is for this reason that Arnstein’s reference to expert testimony here is in conjunction
with its mention of analytic “dissection,” a reference to the process of breaking down the work
into its constituent parts in order to analyze the origin and protectability of different components. 60
As should be apparent, the expert is meant to aid the court in determining just this breakdown—
i.e., how much of the plaintiff’s work is itself unprotected since it draws on prior sources or
materials that are in the public domain. Expert testimony in other words aids on the question of
protectability that is implicit—yet crucial—in the first step of Arnstein. Built into the infringement
analysis is thus an implicit emphasis on protectability.
At least as framed by the court, Krofft’s first step—extrinsic copying—has little to do with
actual copying by the defendant. All the same, even in the Ninth Circuit (and by Krofft’s own
admission) such actual copying is needed. What this reveals then is that in Krofft, there is in reality
a step zero, which covers a part of Arnstein’s first step. The Ninth Circuit refers to this as the
question of “access” rather than factual copying, but it is a crucial preliminary to any further
analysis. 61 Access is meant to allow courts to infer actual copying and then proceed to the question
of substantial similarity, which Krofft breaks down into two further steps. By framing its step zero
as being about “access”, the Ninth Circuit effectively eliminates the issue of copying from this
step and instead merely focuses on whether the defendant had reasonable access to the plaintiff’s
work, regardless of what the defendant actually did with such access. To the extent that the Krofft
test must give effect to the idea that works embody uncopyrightable elements, the extrinsic test
becomes crucial.
58

Alan Latman, “Probative Similarity” as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright
Infringement, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1187 (1990).
59

See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (“Not all copying,
however, is copyright infringement.”).
60

Arnstein, 154 F. 2d at 468.

61

Krofft, 562 F. 2d at 1172.
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Bringing the Krofft framework on parallel with the Arnstein test on the first step would thus
imply having the extrinsic test expressly address the issue of protectability, before proceeding to a
side-by-side comparison of the two works. Yet, the extrinsic test—as formulated in Krofft—does
just the opposite. In focusing on the similarity of “ideas” and other potentially unprotectable
elements (such as the “type of artwork involved, the materials used, the subject matter, and the
setting for the subject”), Krofft sidesteps focusing on protectability. 62 Later panels of the Ninth
Circuit have noted this absurdity and attempted to re-focus the extrinsic test on protectability by
characterizing it as being about “objective manifestations of creativity” focused on “the
measurable, objective elements that constitute . . . expression” and noting that “only those elements
of a work that are protectable and used without the author’s permission can be compared.” 63 All
the same, even in this reformulation the focus does not appear to be primarily on protectability. It
instead emphasizes the objective breakdown of the work in order to enable a court to determine
whether the similarity is sufficient to allow for a subjective comparison.
The second step in Arnstein focuses on wrongful copying, and asks the fact-finder, i.e.,
ordinarily the jury, to determine whether the defendant’s copying of protected expression from the
plaintiff’s work was sufficient in both qualitative and quantitative terms so as to amount to an
infringement. Hence the phrase “wrongful” or “illicit” copying, for the test. The comparison is
meant to be subjective in that the fact-finder is meant to rely on his or her perception (or equivalent
sensorial facility) and intuition for the determination. With perceived similarity being the crucial
touchstone of this step, the framework attempts to limit (though not prohibit) expert testimony,
which could obviously influence such perception. A professional musician’s ability to distinguish
two musical compositions will thus obviously be different from a lay person’s comparison of them,
and the test strongly prefers the latter. 64 Yet it is crucial to recognize that the reason why this
framework can be comfortable in relying on such subjectivity without worrying about the factfinder’s misunderstanding about the protected elements of the work, is because the prior step
focused entirely on protectability. In other words, the Arnstein framework quite neatly parses out
protectability and perceivable similarity in its two steps, even if it presents other problems.
Krofft’s second step replicates the subjective assessment contained in the Arnstein second step.
It thus focuses on the perception of the works by lay fact-finders. And while it endorses Arnstein’s
idea of keeping expert testimony out of this analysis, it pays little attention to the fact that the
extrinsic test may not have sufficiently addressed the question of protectability. The extrinsic test’s
focus on “objective” elements may at times overlap with copyright’s criteria for protection, but it
need not have to. Finding a similarity in plot lines or characters in two works is of little use if those
common elements are themselves drawn from another source. What this inevitably means then is

62

Id. at 1164.

63

Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F. 2d 1353, 1359 (9th Cir. 1990); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F. 3d
435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994).
64
A point that was vividly made by Judge Frank in Arnstein. See Arnstein, 154 F. 2d at 473 (“The impression
made on the refined ears of musical experts or their views as to the musical excellence of plaintiff's or defendant's
works are utterly immaterial on the issue of misappropriation; for the views of such persons are caviar to the general
— and plaintiff's and defendant's compositions are not caviar.”).
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that the notion of protectability—central to copyright—cannot be eliminated altogether from the
intrinsic test. And for this, expert testimony is essential and cannot be foregone.
The Krofft test’s conflation of protectability and perceivability remained largely manageable
in practice when the dispute involved non-technical subject matter that lay audiences routinely
encountered—literary works, artistic works, musical works, and the like. When it came to technical
subject matter such as computer software, the problem became exacerbated. Here, like with literary
works in a foreign language, lay juries are incapable of making analytical sense of the expression
itself. Without being able to understand and contextualize the expression, they became forced to
invariably conflate protectability and similarity. Juries had to shoot in the dark in making side-byside comparisons of subject matter that they had little understanding of and were unlikely to have
ever encountered before.
Altai recognized this problem—inherent in both the Arnstein and Krofft tests, but more
trenchant in the latter—and modified the prohibition on expert testimony during comparisons of
computer software. Since the Ninth Circuit never expressly endorsed (or applied) this modification
in Altai, the circuit continues to adhere to the original formulation tracing back to Krofft and
without any consideration of its implications for technical subject matter. 65 Therein emerged the
nuttiness of the Ninth Circuit’s rule.
IV. Antonick v. Electronic Arts: Manifestation of the “Nutty” Rule
Several cases in the Ninth Circuit suggested that wooden application of the Krofft rule limiting
the use of experts would not make much sense in software cases, 66 but it was not until Antonick v.
Electronic Arts 67 that the Ninth Circuit directly confronted the admissibility of expert witness
testimony in computer software cases. The backstory to this litigation is important to
understanding the Ninth Circuit’s surprising decisions to bar expert testimony that would enable
lay jurors to compare the works at issue.

65
In Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1478 (9th Cir. 1992), Judge Sneed noted in a
concurring opinion that the Ninth Circuit precedent “provides a poor analytic structure by which to determine the
substantial similarity of an allegedly infringing computer program,” preferring the Third Circuit’s “integrated
substantial similarity test pursuant to which both lay and expert testimony would be admissible.”
66

See Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (suggesting
that “an integrated test involving expert testimony and analytic dissection may well be the wave of the future in
[computer software cases], but noting that the Ninth Circuit’s position “is clearly marked out in Krofft, and controls
the analysis here”); Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1478 (9th Cir. 1992) (Sneed, J.,
concurring).
67

841 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2016).
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A. Development of the Madden Football Video Game 68
The Antonick case grew out of the development of Madden Football, the iconic video game
that launched the sports video game industry. 69 As an industry observer aptly noted in 2013, the
25th anniversary of the game,
From its humble beginnings on an Apple II computer in 1988 to the modern marvels now
featured on PS3 and Xbox 360 (and soon to further amaze on the next generation consoles),
Madden's evolution largely mirrors the evolution of video games in general. Few
franchises—really, only Mario and Zelda—have had the cultural staying power and impact
of Madden. 70
Prior to Madden Football, video games were relatively primitive in their simulation of sport
activities. In the early 1980s, the state of the art for video football games featured only three or
five players per side due to the limitations of early microcomputers. The early games did not hold
users’ attention for long because the players ran predetermined routes and the outcomes were
determined by static rules. In 1983, Robin Antonick, a former college football player and skilled
computer programmer, conceived of a far more authentic football video game that could simulate
11 on 11 player action and sophisticated dynamic models of player behavior. He showed a
prototype to William “Trip” Hawkins, founder and Chief Executive Officer of Electronic Arts
(EA), then a fledging video game publisher. 71 Hawkins was impressed. Soon thereafter EA hired
Antonick as an independent contractor to develop a commercial version of the game. The EAAntonick contract provided Antonick with royalties on versions of the game that Antonick
developed as well as games derived from his versions.
After that deal was signed and Antonick had begun work on the commercial version of the
video game, Hawkins persuaded John Madden, former coach of the Oakland Raiders and a popular
NFL broadcaster, to lend his name to the game. Antonick and Hawkins translated Madden’s
playbook and play calling into computer algorithms and integrated them into the computer
program.
In December 1986, EA and Antonick revised the agreement, pursuant to which Antonick
would develop the newly titled “John Madden Football” videogame for the Apple II, Commodore
64, and IBM platforms. 72 In addition to receiving compensation for those “Works,” 73 Antonick
would be entitled to royalties on all “Derivative Works,” defined as:
68
The section draws on Appellant’s Brief, Antonick v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 14-15298 (D.C. No. 3:11-CV01543-CRB) (Docket Entry 14) (Aug. 1, 2014) (hereinafter cited as “Antonick 9th Circuit Opening Brief”) and Robin
Antonick v. Electronic Arts, Complaint, ¶ 77 CV 11:1548 EDL (N.D. Cal., Mar. 30, 2011), 2011 WL 7942206
(hereinafter cited as “Antonick Complaint”).
69
See John Gaudiosi, Madden. The $4 billion video game franchise, CNN (Sep. 5, 2013),
https://money.cnn.com/2013/09/05/technology/innovation/madden-25/.
70

Timothy Rapp, Madden 25: Rounding Up Reviews of Iconic Game, Bleacher Report (Aug. 27, 2013),
https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1751592-madden-25-rounding-up-reviews-of-iconic-game.
71

Trip Hawkins, a former Apple employee, founded Electronic Arts in 1982. See Electronic Arts, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_Arts.
72

Electronic Arts, Software Developments and Publishing Agreement, (hereinafter cited as “1986 contract”).

73

See id. at § 5.
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any computer software program or electronic game which either (a) constitutes a derivative
work of the Work within the meaning of the United States copyright law or (b) produces
audiovisual effects which infringe the copyright in the audiovisual effects produced by the
Work. Derivative Works include, for example, significant enhancements of the Work to
add additional features or improve performance and adaptations of the Work to operate on
computers or operating systems other than those described in the Specifications. 74
EA also promised to (i) protect against unauthorized use of Antonick’s intellectual property,
including his Development Aids, 75 and (ii) offer Antonick a right of first refusal to develop
Derivative Works.
Over the next two years, Antonick developed the computer source code for the original
John Madden Football video game, which was implemented on the Apple II computer (“Apple
II Madden”). Antonick’s game took the video game genre from primitive abstract games with
few players and simple actions to sophisticated simulation of multi-faceted, 11 on 11 football
action integrating player data, complex strategies, and user manipulation of player controls.
In February 1987, Antonick and EA executed Amendment 1 to the 1986 Contract. Among
other things, Antonick agreed to a higher royalty rate on sales of Works and “Derivative Works
by Artist” and, depending on the microprocessor used, a lower or higher royalty rate on
“Derivative Works by Publisher.” Antonick was to receive a royalty for any Derivative Work
in the same “Microprocessor Family” as the Apple II’s microprocessor. Amendment 1 limited
Antonick’s right of first refusal to Derivative Works developed for certain Microprocessor
Families, but also provided that if Antonick developed a Derivative Work for a “new”
Microprocessor Family, his right of first refusal would be revived with respect to that family.
Finally, EA promised “not to use or otherwise provide” Antonick’s Development Aids to
employees or third parties in preparing Derivative Works on different microprocessor families.
As a means of simulating actual National Football League games, Antonick integrated the
physics of player and ball movement with a player ratings model based on multiple attributes.
Drawing on his football knowledge, Antonick combined the player ratings structure with an
elaborate system of hundreds of offensive and defensive plays. After EA signed NFL Hall of
Fame football coach and popular broadcast announcer John Madden to collaborate and lend
his name to the game, Antonick adapted and refined the existing plays and play-calling to
incorporate Madden’s ideas.
Around that time, Richard Hilleman, an EA employee, joined the project as the Apple II
Madden producer. Antonick spoke with Hilleman regularly, discussing, among other things,
the execution of game features and solutions to implementation issues. In addition, Antonick
was required to deliver detailed documentation of his code and other intellectual property,
including (i) “complete assembled source code with sufficient comments to allow the easy
understanding of each routine, subroutine and table by an individual conversant with 6502
assembly language”; (ii) “an overall program description, including the file name of each
module of code,” “a narrative of the flow of control,” “a complete list of subroutines with a

74

See id., Exhibit A § 1.03 (definition of “Derivative Work”).

75

“Development Aids” included equipment, firmware, and software utilities developed or used by Antonick that
might be useful in developing Derivative Works. See 1986 contract, supra note 72, Exhibit A § 5.05.
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short description of each,” and “an explanation of key data structures”; and (iii) a description
of “any firmware or software utilities used.”
In 1988, EA released Apple II Madden. According to EA, the game was an “overnight
success” that “exceeded its high expectations” and “went on to sell more copies than any other
sports game of its time.” 76 On the heels of this acclaim, Antonick programmed Madden games
for the Commodore 64 and IBM-compatible computer platforms. In 1989, he began work on
Madden games for the Nintendo and Sega Genesis entertainment systems. In October 1989,
Antonick and EA entered into Amendment VIII to the 1986 Contract, requiring Antonick to
develop a “script” and a technical design review for Sega Genesis and Nintendo versions and
providing that Antonick would receive “additional compensation” in the form of 3% royalties
on sales of any “Nintendo Derivative Work” or “Sega Genesis Derivative Work.” As producer
on the Nintendo version, Hilleman reviewed Antonick’s design script and discussed
Antonick’s ideas for console games.
In an abrupt shift of course, Hilleman told Antonick in August 1990 that EA had decided
not to publish Derivative Works for Nintendo or Sega Genesis. 77 Instead, Hilleman said that
EA was going in a different direction with a Sega Genesis game with “more of an arcade style.”
Hilleman said that EA had already hired another company, Park Place Productions, to develop
the new Sega game “independently” of Antonick’s work. Because there would be a separation
between Antonick’s work and the development of the Sega game, Antonick would have no
royalty or other rights in the Sega game. Hilleman also told Antonick that the “Nintendo
marketplace had started to disintegrate” and to stop working on Nintendo Madden.
Just three months later—barely in time for the holiday shopping season—EA released its
first version of Sega Madden. 78 EA continued to issue Madden games for Sega Genesis, Super
Nintendo, and other platforms annually since 1992. After Antonick completed the second IBM
game in 1992, his work with EA was substantially over, and he moved on to other projects.
EA’s Madden Football franchise would go on to remarkable sustained success, racking up
billions of dollars in revenue. 79
B. Antonick’s Discovery that EA Based Sega Madden on Apple II Madden
In conjunction with its celebration of Madden Football’s twentieth anniversary in 2009,
EA released publicity materials describing the game’s history. To Antonick’s surprise, the
materials traced the Sega Madden to Antonick’s Apple II Madden version. Antonick viewed a
CNBC interview of Trip Hawkins, who also connected the design and coding of the later
editions of the Madden Football video game software franchise back to Apple II Madden.
Antonick looked further into the matter and discovered on the website of Park Place co-founder

76

See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Electronic Arts’ Second Motion for Summary Judgment, Antonick v. Electronic
Arts, Inc., at 5 (citing Ex. 11 “It’s In The Game,” at 4; Ex. 12, 20th Anniversary Publication), 2012 WL 7060456
(hereinafter cited as “Plaintiff’s Opposition to Second MSJ”).
77

See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Second MSJ, supra note 76, at 7-9.

78
See Trial Transcript, at 478, Antonick v. Electronic Arts, 3:11-cv-01543-CRB (N.D. Cal.) (hereinafter cited as
“Trial Transcript”).
79

By 2013, Electronic Arts had sold more than 100 million copies of Madden NFL, generating more than $4
billion in total sales. See Madden NFL, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madden_NFL.
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Troy Lyndon that he credited EA’s Hilleman with helping to develop 1990 Sega Madden,
noting that Hilleman spent “countless hours” with Park Place programmer Jim Simmons to
make the game more realistic. Antonick then realized that, contrary to Hilleman’s assurances
in 1990, Sega Madden had not been developed independently of Apple II Madden. 80 Hilleman,
who had worked on Apple II Madden and had intimate knowledge of its design and code,
apparently played a direct and critical role in developing Sega Madden.
Antonick alleged that until these revelations, he had no reason to question EA’s account of
how Sega Madden was developed. The Sega Genesis gaming platform had a more powerful
microprocessor than the Apple II resulting in a more realistic visual simulation. Therefore, the
Madden Sega screen displays differed substantially from the Madden Apple II visual
appearance. 81 Yet the underlying code could well have been derived from Madden Apple II.
Antonick did not have access to the Sega Madden source code and therefore could not have
assessed the extent to which Park Place based Sega Madden on Apple II Madden’s software
code and design.
As a result of the 2009 information, Antonick became suspicious that Park Place had not,
as EA informed him, developed Sega Madden independently. EA had assured Antonick that it
would safeguard his source code and design documents, and would ensure that the
development of any subsequent works that were outside of the “derivative works” definition
would only be produced using a “clean room” process. 82 Growing out of a seminal copyright
case involving Sega, 83 the software industry came to follow a “clean room” process for
independently developing interoperable software, 84 but the 2009 revelations appeared to

80

In a November 2009 interview, Lyndon stated that “Hilleman came down to our office and liver there for well
over a month with Simmons turning something that looked good into something that actually played great football.”
See Antonick Complaint, supra note 68, at ¶ 77.
81

The parties stipulated that “[p]laying or viewing a John Madden Football video game for the Sega Genesis or
Super Nintendo would not have allowed the person looking at the screen or playing the game to determine how a
particular game element was expressed in source code.” See Trial Transcript, supra note 78, at 466.
82

See Antonick Complaint, supra note 68, at ¶¶ 59-65.

83

See Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that reverse engineering of
copyrighted software to discover its unprotected features constitutes fair use).
84

The “clean room” process was formalized during the first wave of software copyright litigation as a means of
developing interoperable software and ensuring that proprietary materials do not infect software development. The
clean room process typically involves three teams of engineers and legal specialists. The first team—referred to as the
“specification” or “dirty room” team—works with the target software to determine the functional specifications. A
second “coordination” or “audit” team, comprised of attorneys and engineers, establishes clear ground rules for
managing the clean room process, screens programmers for the “clean room” team so as to ensure they have never
seen the copyright-protected code, documents the activities and communication of the “dirty room” and “clean room”
teams, oversees the process, and advises on what constitutes functional specifications and how to determine code
segments that are unprotectable—segments that are unoriginal, standard programming practices, and necessary for
interoperability or to accomplish specific processes or methods. The coordination team seeks to ensure that no
copyright-protected expression or misappropriated trade secrets get communicated to the clean room team. It is only
after those checks are completed that the process of independently coding an interoperable program commences. The
functional specifications detailing the particular processes or results that the target program accomplishes is then
passed to the “clean room” team of programmers. This team remains shielded from the copyright-protected code. It
designs, writes, and tests code aimed at accomplishing the target functional specifications. See Menell, supra note 37,
at 448-49; P. Anthony Sammi, Christopher A. Lisy & Andrew Gish, Good Clean Fun: Using Clean Room Procedures
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contradict EA’s assurances that Sega Madden was not derived from Antonick’s work
product. 85 EA was entitled to pursue such derivative works, but was required pursuant to its
contracts with Antonick to pay him an ongoing royalty.
C. Antonick’s Complaint and the Copyright Infringement Issue
In March 2011, Antonick filed suit against EA alleging breach of contract and fraud. 86 The
complaint implicated copyright law through the clause of the Antonick-EA contact that entitled
Antonick to royalties if subsequent versions of Madden Football “constitute[] a derivative
work of [Apple II Madden] within the meaning of the United States copyright law.” 87 The
contract defined “Derivative Works” to “include, for example, significant enhancements of the
Work to add additional features or improve performance and adaptations of the Work to
operate on computers or operating systems other than those described in the Specifications.”
Hence, the Antonick contract cause of action turned on whether Sega Madden was derived, the
copyright sense, from Apple II Madden.
The Copyright Act defines a “derivative work”
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations,
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of
authorship, is a “derivative work”. 88
Courts base the determination of whether a subsequent work constitutes a derivative work on
whether it violates the right to reproduce, i.e., whether it is an infringement of the copyrighted
work. 89 Therefore, the key legal issue was whether Sega Madden infringed Apple II Madden.

in Intellectual Property Litigation, 25 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3 (2013); Jorge Contreras, Laura Handley &
Terrence Yang, NEC v. Intel: Breaking New Ground in the Law of Copyright, 3 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 209 (1990); G.
Gervaise Davis III, Scope of Protection of Computer-Based Works: Reverse Engineering, Clean Rooms and
Decompilation, 370 COMPUTER L. INST., 115 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Practice
Course Handbook Series No. G-370, 1993).
85

See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Second MSJ, supra note 76, at 9-12.
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See Robin Antonick v. Electronic Arts, Complaint, CV 11:1548 EDL (N.D. Cal., Mar. 30, 2011), 2011 WL
7942206; John Gaudiosi, Madden Creator Sues Electronic Arts for Millions in Royalties, Forbes (Apr. 1, 2011),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johngaudiosi/2011/04/01/madden-creator-sues-electronic-arts-for-millions-inroyalties/#cbfdcba4d32a.
87

See 1986 Contract, supra note 72.

88

17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “derivative work”).

89

See 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.09[A][1] (suggesting that right to prepare derivative works is superfluous in
that “[u]nless enough of the pre-existing work is contained in the later work to constitute the latter an infringement of
the former, the latter, by definition, is not a derivative work”); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir.
1984) (holding that a work is derivative “only if it would be considered an infringing work if the material which it had
derived from a prior work had been taken without the consent of the copyright proprietor of the prior work” (emphasis
in original) (citing United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 965 n.2 (9th Cir. 1976))).
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D. Pre-Trial Proceedings: Improper Whittling of the Plaintiff’s Basis for Showing that
EA Derived Sega Madden from Apple II Madden
The case was ultimately assigned to Judge Charles Breyer of the Northern District of
California. EA sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Antonick waited too long to file
suit. Judge Breyer denied EA’s motion to dismiss and ordered the case to be tried in three phases:
(1) EA’s statute of limitations defense; (2) EA’s liability with respect to Madden games released
before 1996; and (3) EA’s liability with respect to non-Madden games 90 and post-1996 Madden
games. Phases (1) and (2) were to be done seriatim with the same jury. Phase 3, if necessary, would
follow at a later time. 91
In view of the technical and legal complexity of the case, the parties engaged in extensive
discovery disputes and motion practice. Remarkably, EA failed to locate complete copies of the
source code for Apple II Madden and early versions of Sega Madden. Nonetheless, Antonick had
retained source code for versions of the games that he designed and other documentation, including
a 60 page game manual detailing the Apple II Madden design. He retained Michael Barr, an
experienced computer engineering expert. 92 Barr prepared a detailed report analyzing Antonick’s
source code files, source code and technical files produced by EA containing source code for eight
distinct versions of Madden football games for Sega Genesis and Super Nintendo, as well as
various documents, declarations, discovery responses, and depositions. 93
Antonick alleged that Simmons, Park Place’s lead programmer, was woefully behind schedule
producing Sega Madden and called in EA’s Hilleman, who was intimately familiar with
Antonick’s design and code, in order to meet the tight production deadline. And that although Sega
Madden was written in a different assembly code language for the Sega Genesis console (which
used the Motorola 68000 microprocessor as opposed to the Apple II’s MOS Technology 6502
microprocessor), 94 Simmons and his team followed the Apple II Madden design down to the nonstandard field dimensions, 95 player directional tracking system, 96 particular play routes, naming
(including misspellings) and ordering of plays, player rating model, decision points, data flow

90

Antonick alleged that other EA sports games, such as NCAA Football and NHL Hockey, also constituted
derivative works of Apple II Madden for which royalties should have been paid.
91

See Eriq Garner, Electronic Arts Faces Jury Trial Over ‘Madden NFL’, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Apr. 26,
2013), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/electronic-arts-faces-jury-trial-447243.
92
See Michael Barr, Expert Resume, Antonick v. Electronic Arts, 3:11-cv-01543-CRB (N.D. Cal.) (filed Nov.
21, 2012), 2012 WL 7160593.
93

See Rule 26(a)(2)(B) Report of Michael Barr, Antonick v. Electronic Arts Inc., 3:11-cv-01543-CRB (N.D. Cal.)
(filed Nov. 21, 2012 under seal), Ex. B (hereinafter cited as “Barr Report”) (explaining “[t]he source code for a pair
of programs written in different assembly languages will look very different to the casual observer—even if they do
the very same things—just as a pair of contracts for the same purpose but written in German and Spanish will appear
visually different”).
94

See id. at 18, 27-29.

95

Whereas the NFL uses a field width of 53.33 yards, Antonick used an 80 yard width. This feature carries over
to many aspects of the coding and representation of the video game as the game players, unlike actual NFL players,
will move more quickly up and down the field that they will more laterally.
96

Barr opined that the use of the same directional tracking system made it easier for Park Place to emulate many
other aspects of Antonick’s game design, subroutines, and coding. See Barr Report, supra note 93, at 51.
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architecture, and game engine design (e.g., representation of ball carrier positioning and player
pursuit, use of randomness in conjunction with player ability to introduce variable uncertainty).
Barr’s analysis showed that Sega Madden’s compilation of features, as well as sub-feature design,
choice, and particular code elements, were substantially similar to Apple II Madden.
In response, EA sought to whittle down Antonick’s basis for proving that Sega Madden was a
derivative work through summary judgment motions, motions in limine, and jury instructions.
Drawing on inapt lines of cases limiting the scope of copyright protection for general functional
features of computer software, 97 EA persuaded Judge Breyer to restrict the basis for asserting
similarity to two of the ten elements that Antonick sought to use in showing that Sega Madden
constituted a derivative work of Apple II Madden: (1) non-standard field width; and (2) plays and
formations. 98 Thus, the court severely impeded Antonick’s core compilation theory, but the
granular design and coding decisions relating to plays and formations left some room for pursuing
the derivative work case. Further stacking the deck in EA’s favor, Judge Breyer drew on another
line of inapt cases 99 to require that Antonick prove not merely that Sega Madden was substantially
similar to Apple II Madden, but that it was virtually identical. 100
These rulings fundamentally misconstrued applicable copyright principles. Copyright law
protects original compilations of even individually unprotectable elements. 101 Although all of the
individual words in a language are unprotectable, copyright law robustly protects the compilation

97
See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (involving the declarations necessary
for interoperability); Incredible Technologies, Inc. v. Virtual Technologies, Inc., 400 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 2005)
(involving an independently developed video golf game); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th
Cir. 1994) (involving a microcomputer graphical user interface using a desktop metaphor, much of which was licensed
to the defendant); Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988) (involving an independently
developed video soccer game). We explain further below why these cases are inapt. See, infra, text accompanying
notes 106-14.
98

See Jury Instructions, Antonick v. Electronic Arts Inc., 3:11-cv-01543-CRB (N.D. Cal.) (filed July 19, 2013),
at 5-6 (hereinafter cited as “Jury Instructions”; Phase Two Pretrial Order, Antonick v. Electronic Arts Inc., 3:11-cv01543-CRB (N.D. Cal.) (filed July 2, 2013); Memorandum and Order re Defendant’s Third Motion for Summary
Judgment, Antonick v. Electronic Arts Inc., 3:11-cv-01543-CRB (N.D. Cal.) (filed May 10, 2013) (sealed) (hereinafter
cited as “Third MSJ Order”).
99

See Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2010); Incredible Technologies, Inc. v. Virtual
Technologies, Inc., 400 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 2005); Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003); Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994); Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197 (9th
Cir. 1989); Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988). We explain below why these cases are
inapt. See, infra, text accompanying notes 114-16.
100

See Jury Instructions, supra note 98, at 6 (instructing the jury that Antonick “must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that considering Sega Madden as a whole—that is, considering both the protected and unprotected
elements—an ordinary reasonable observer would find Sega Madden virtually identical to Apple II Madden”
(emphasis added)); Third MSJ Order, supra note 98.
101

See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (protecting compilations); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a “compilation” as “a work formed
by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such
a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship”). See generally 1 Nimmer on
Copyright §3.04[B] (discussing the legal standard for protection of compilations); Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural
Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding an original compilation of otherwise uncopyrightable
components to be protected); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991) (format of baseball form
containing pitching statistics copyrightable).
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that comprises a novel. Similarly, although copyright law does not protect individual colors,
copyright generally subsists in paintings comprising an original compilation of colors. In the
computer software context, even though individual 1’s and 0’s of object code and general
processes and algorithms are not copyrightable, original compilations of specific coding and
design choices are generally protectable unless there is only one or a few ways of accomplishing
the functional task. 102 The robustness of copyright protection for computer programs—their
thickness or thinness—depends, as in other copyrightable works, on the range of expressive
choice. 103 The design and coding of a very intricate video game, such as Apple II Madden, attracts
significant copyright protection as a compilation of protectable and unprotectable elements even
though particular names, plays, directional tracking designs, and decision points are individually
unprotectable. And even though the rules of football cannot be monopolized through copyright
protection, the compilation of particular ways that they are implemented in a sophisticated
software product can be copyrightable.
Even after the first football video game is published, others are free to independently develop
their own football video games, but they are not free to copy highly particularized design and
coding choices of the first-comer without authorization. Nor can they develop sequels or more
advanced versions that draw significantly upon on the granular design and coding elements of the
original work. 104 Second comers usually lack access to the source code, which is typically not
publicly released. Video game publishers typically protect their source code as trade secrets. They
distribute their games in object code format from which it is very difficult to decipher the source
code. 105
EA drew Judge Breyer off-course by focusing on software cases that fundamentally differed
from the alleged copying that occurred in the Antonick case. In Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx,

102

See NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 18-21 (1979). Courts have
treated the this report as legislative history to the 1980 amendments to the 1976 Act. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software
Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260–61 (5th Cir. 1988); Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252 (3d
Cir. 1983).
103

See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 Duke L.J. 203, 221-26 (2012)
(discussing thickness as a variable in copyright infringement analysis).
104
The language in the EA-Antonick contract arguably went further than copyright law’s derivative work right in
stating that “derivative works” “include, for example, significant enhancements of the Work to add additional features
or improve performance and adaptations of the Work to operate on computers or operating systems other than those
described in the Specifications.” See 1986 Contract, supra note 72. Based on the contract’s preceding sentence stating
that “derivative works” for which royalties were due “constitute[] a derivative work of [Apple II Madden] within the
meaning of the United States copyright law, Judge Breyer accorded no weight to the express enhancement example
in the contract. This interpretation was questionable as the scope of the derivative work right under the 1976 Act was
somewhat ambiguous at the time that the contract was drafted and the enhancement example provides a concrete
indication of the parties’ intent.
105

Trade secret protection, however, is not absolute. Trade secret law does not bar reverse engineering. See; Peter
S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1351-53 (1987). Competitors
can at times (but often at great cost) reverse engineer the functional specifications of computer programs. They can
use those functional specifications to produce interoperable or otherwise competing products without violating
copyright law. See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Donald S. Chisum, Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Paul Goldstein, Robert A. Gorman, Dennis S. Karjala, Edmund W. Kitch, Peter S. Menell, Leo J. Raskind,
Jerome H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, LaST Frontier Conference on Copyright Protection of Computer
Software, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 15, 23-25, 32 (1989).
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Inc., 106 and Incredible Technologies, Inc. v. Virtual Technologies, Inc., 107 the plaintiff sought to
monopolize karate and soccer video games, respectively, by seeking to block independently
developed video games based on the general rules of these sports as well as general hardware and
software constraints. In Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., Oracle seeks to protect arguably
unprotectable declarations necessary for computer system interoperability. 108 And in Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., Apple sought to block Microsoft and others to whom it licensed
many elements of its graphical user interface from implementing the desktop metaphor for
organizing microcomputer screen layout and functionality. 109
While all of these cases are important to understanding the general contours of copyright
protection for computer software, they differ fundamentally from the issues raised in Antonick v.
Electronic Arts. In Data East and Incredible Technologies, the defendants independently
developed their software from scratch; they had no access to the source code or particular design
architecture of the plaintiff’s software. Furthermore, unlike Antonick v. Electronic Arts, those cases
related to the audiovisual elements, not the underlying code. The games appeared similar to the
plaintiffs’ works because they followed the rules and context of the sport (soccer or golf) and
general software and video game principles. In Oracle v. Google, Google independently
implemented the source code using only the declarations necessary for interoperability. 110 And in
Apple v. Microsoft, a prior licensing agreement afforded the defendants use of many of the
elements of Apple’s graphical user interface. Furthermore, the desktop metaphor for a user
interface was both obvious and developed originally by Xerox for its Star workstation. 111 Apple’s
design team based the Apple Lisa and Apple Macintosh on the Xerox Star design. 112 Moreover,
Apple hired Larry Tesler, one of the developers of the Xerox Star, to join the Apple development
team. 113 None of these cases involved an insider with access to source code.
By contrast, the central issue in Antonick v. Electronic Arts was whether EA and Park Place
used Antonick’s detailed program design, documentation, and source code in developing Sega
Madden. Simmons allegedly had unfettered access to Antonick’s design documents and code and
received guidance and supervision from Hilleman and other EA employees intimately familiar
with Antonick’s granular programming choices. Under impossibly tight time-to-market pressure,
EA and Park Place’s inexperienced programmer took shortcuts—copying protectable design and

106

862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988).

107

400 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 2005).

108

See Menell, supra note 37, at 376-89.

109

See Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
35 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994).
110

See id., at 366-67.

111

See Xerox Star, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xerox_Star.

112

Members of the Apple Lisa engineering team saw Star at its introduction at the 1981 National Computer
Conference and converted their desktop manager to an icon-based interface modeled on the Star. See “An Interview
with Wayne Rosing, Bruce Daniels, and Larry Tesler,” 2 BYTE 90 (1983).
113

See Larry Tesler, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Larry_Tesler; John Markoff, Lawrence Tesler, Who Made
Personal
Computing
Easier,
Dies
at
74,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
27,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/20/technology/lawrence-tesler-dead.html
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coding elements—to complete in three months what Antonick’s experienced team had taken four
years to accomplish.
EA also drew Judge Breyer off-course on the standard for similarity by focusing on cases
involving simple, narrowly protected elements, none of which involved the sophisticated, granular,
integrated design and coding choices involved in the Madden football video games. Harper House,
Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 114 involved the largely standardized visual layout of a day planner
(comprising a calendar and ruled lines). Data East and Incredible Technologies solely involved
the conventional audiovisual elements for karate and golf videogames. Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp. involved largely unoriginal (and licensed) graphical office icons. Satava v.
Lowry, 115 involved a jellyfish sculpture encased in a domed glass cylinder. And Mattel, Inc. v.
MGA Entm’t, Inc., 116 involved a “sculpt” for human-based dolls with enlarged facial features and
feet. None of these cases involved anywhere near the complexity and range of choice reflected in
the Apple II Madden video game.
Consequently, the court should not have elevated the standard for similarity. While the court
was correct in filtering out unprotectable elements as separate bases for infringement, it erred in
effectively blocking the core of Antonick’s compilation infringement allegation. The full Barr
Report provided just that type of analysis. He examined both the Apple II Madden compilation
forest and the particularized trees. Judge Breyer’s severe whittling of the case excluded not only
most of the trees but also the forest.
Copyright law does not work that way. Novelists can enjoin those who reproduce their
compilation of unprotectable words and artists can enjoin those who reproduce their compilation
of unprotectable colors. By treating Antonick v. Electronic Arts like cases in which software
developers independently produce competing sports video games without access to the underlying
code, visual artists take only the idea and not the particularized expression for an artistic work (a
jelly fish encased in a glass dome or a doll with pronounced facial features and feet), and a mobile
phone developer uses unprotectable code necessary for interoperable sub-systems and implements
the operating system in a clean room, Judge Breyer improperly ripped the heart out of the
plaintiff’s case.
E. Jury Trial: Verdicts for Antonick
The statute of limitations trial commenced on June 17, 2013. 117 EA contended that Antonick
waited too long to file his lawsuit. Antonick countered that he only became aware of the alleged
breach of contract as a result of Hawkins’ revelations during the Madden Football 20th anniversary
celebration. After several days of proceedings, the jury unanimously found that Antonick did not
discover or know of facts that would have caused a reasonable person to suspect that EA had

114

889 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1989).

115

323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003).

116

616 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2010).

117

See Beth Winegarner, EA Can’t Sink ‘Madden’ Royalties Suit in Jury Trial, LAW 360 (Jun. 21, 2013),
https://www.law360.com/articles/452353.
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breached its 1986 contract with Antonick before November, 21, 2005, and therefore the case was
not barred by the statute of limitations.118
After a two week hiatus to prepare for the liability phase, the parties presented their opening
arguments on July 9, 2013 to the same jury. Both parties (and Judge Breyer) recognized that
software experts would be needed for the jury to understand computer programming and software
code. During her opening statement, EA’s lead counsel displayed some source code from Sega
Madden and forthrightly acknowledged that “[t]here are people who can read it. I cannot.” 119
Antonick constructed his argument that Sega Madden was derived from Apple II Madden on
circumstantial and direct forms of evidence. 120 Antonick contended that the only way that Park
Place could have produced the fully functional, highly sophisticated Sega Madden football video
in just a few months was by translating Antonick’s binary play data 121 into source code for the
Sega Genesis 68000 microprocessor. Antonick emphasized the painstaking effort required to
produce well-functioning, bug-free code for a sophisticated football video game, 122 Antonick
reinforced his derivative work contention by showing Simmons’ lack of prior experience playing
football or programming football video games 123 and EA’s failure to provide any credible
explanation for how Simmons obtained or developed the critical play data. 124 Antonick suggested
that EA employees with access to Antonick’s code—likely Michael Brook, EA’s Associate
Producer for Sega Madden, and Richard Hilleman—provided Simmons with the critical source

118

See Reading of the Verdict, Antonick v. Electronic Arts Inc., 3:11-cv-01543-CRB (N.D. Cal.) (Jun. 21, 2013),
2013 WL 12183203.
119

Trial Transcript, supra note 78, at 649, lines 5-6.

120

The court instructed the jury that “[e]vidence may be direct or circumstantial. You should consider both kinds
of evidence. The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given to direct or circumstantial evidence. It is
for you to decide how much weight to give to any evidence.” See id. at 20153, lines 2-6.
121

Judge Breyer ultimately instructed the jury that “the term source code includes binary files.” See id. at 2055,
lines 19-20.
122

See Trial Transcript, supra note 78, at 675-79 (Michael Kawahara); 741-57 (Robin Antonick). Kawahara
testified that a particular defensive play took over a week to create, test and tune. Id. at 677, line 25 – 678, line 1.
Antonick testified that “it would take days and possibly more than a week” to test a single play against all 81 defensive
plays, id. at 749, line 25 – 750, line, and “we had to log hundreds of hours of testing per play to be able to get to the
point where we felt confident that that play was executing up to the norms that we had—that standard that we had set
for the ultimate NFL simulation,” id. at 753, lines 10-13.
123

See id. at 1642, lines 17-25 (Jim Simmons). EA sought to work with Park Place on Sega Madden because it
had produced the successful “Monday Night Football” video arcade game (MNF). See id. at 1245, lines 2-12 (Richard
Hilleman). EA thought that Scott Orr, the lead programmer for MNF, would be leading the Sega Madden team. See
id. at 976, lines 21-23 (Scott Orr) (testifying that he designed MNF in 1989); id. at 2064 (referring to Exhibit 133
(Park Place planning document for SEGA Football), p.4, noting Scott Orr was to provide play data. Orr, however,
only wrote the high-level script for Sega Madden and declined to code the game. See id. at 1661, line 7 – 1662, line 6
(Jim Simmons). EA’s Hilleman complained about Park Place’s shift in staffing for Sega Madden as a “bait and
switch.” Id. at 1157. Antonick contended that Simmons lacked the football and video football coding experience to
handle the responsibilities assigned to him and that he was chosen principally because he was a high school buddy of
Troy Linden, Park Place’s CEO. See id. at 1584, lines 4-6 (Jim Simmons).
124

According to assistant producer Michael Brook, Sega Madden had “[n]o plays, nothing. No play calling.” as
late as July 1990 for a game that was published in November 1990. See id. at 1557, line 20.
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code (and play data) needed for Park Place to get Sega Madden to function properly. 125 EA
conceded that it had access to Antonick’s source code. 126
Antonick offered evidence that EA rushed Sega Madden to market as part of plan to sabotage
Sega’s efforts to gain a strong position in the emerging video football marketplace. This entailed
showing that Trip Hawkins duped Sega into thinking that EA’s development of Sega’s Joe
Montana video football game—a competing game on the Sega Genesis platform—would use
innovations planned for Sega Madden. 127
Antonick called upon Michael Barr, its principal software expert, to explain the design and
coding of the two video games. 128 Barr generally explained how embedded systems, like the Apple
II and the Sega Genesis, function. 129 He also generally discussed programming languages, coding
of embedded systems, compilers, and the distinction between source code and executable code
that can be processes by computer systems. 130
Barr then explained the files that he was provided for analyzing the source code in this case 131
and how he went about deciphering the code bases and design elements to gain insight into the
extent to which the field width and plays and formations in Sega Madden were derived from Apple
II Madden. He used demonstrative examples from his expert report to illustrate the similarities that
would otherwise be obscured by the different code languages and data structures. This in part
involved explaining hexadecimal (base 16) representation of numerical information. 132 Through
his deciphering of code, Barr was able to show numerous examples of code and play data that were
similar or identical in Apple II Madden and Sega Madden. These examples were then illustrated
to the jury using demonstrative exhibits.
Figure 1 (demonstrative exhibit 485) illustrated how the internal numbering of offensive plays
in 1990 Sega Madden matched the numbering, selection, and arrangement of plays in Apple II
Madden. 133 The 1990 edition of Sega Madden had fewer plays than Apple II Madden, but it drew
almost entirely from the 81 offensive plays in Apple II Madden and used a nearly identical internal
numbering system.

125

See id. at 1557-58 (Michael Brook); id. at 1659, lines 8-16, 1664-67 (Jim Simmons).

126

See id. at 2062, lines 8-12.

127

See id. at 1715-19, 1748-50 (Trip Hawkins).

128

See id. at 1295-1325, 1342-1456, 1475-90.

129

See id. at 1299-1303.

130

See id. at 1303-1305.

131

See id. at 1305-1312.

132

See id. at 1322-1323.

133

See id. at 1362-1371.
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Figure 1

Barr next explained how it was possible to compare the player formations and movements
across the two games. Figure 2 (demonstrative exhibit 645) depicts the data from the Apple II
Madden assembly language program. 134 The semicolons indicated comments. Thus, the first row
indicates that this is the “Nickel,” or five defensive back formation. The second row indicates the
11 player designations (0 followed by 1-10 to equal 11). The third row indicates the X coordinate
position in the two-dimensional field grid. The fourth row indicates the Y coordinate position. The
locations in the grid are represented in hexadecimal (dollar sign followed by a two element
representation with the size indicated by 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, A, B, C, D, E, F).

134

See id. at 1362-1371.
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Figure 2
;
;
FX42
FY42
FP42

NICKEL
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
DB $8D,$75,$99,$69,$99,$69,$5D,$39,$D5,$81,$B1
DB $7F,$7F,$7F,$7F,$7C,$7C,$73,$79,$79,$70,$76
DB 01, 02, 05, 06, 08, 10, 13, 15, 14, 18, 17

;X COORDINATE
;Y COORDINATE
;POSITION

Figure 3 (demonstrative exhibit 646) is the data generated by the Apple II Madden play
editor. 135 It provides the data for simulating the play called NIC reddog, which indicates a
defensive rush or blitz, 136 from the Nickel defensive formation.
Figure 3

Figure 4 (demonstrative exhibit 647) depicts source code from 1990 Sega Madden for a
formation and play. 137 Barr explained that the play data is in binary code.

135

See id. at 1373-1375.

136

See Blitz (gridiron football), WIKIPEDIA (explaining the origin of the term “red-dog” in football),
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blitz_(gridiron_football).
137

Trial Transcript, supra note 78, at 1375-1377.
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Figure 4

As a way of enabling the jury to visually compare the plays and formations of the two games,
Barr developed software to read in the data from both games and generate side-by-side depictions
of formations and player movements in relationship to the line of scrimmage. 138 Figure 5 (first
page of demonstrative exhibit 476) shows that comparison. The left side depicts offensive plays
16, 19, 41, 48, and 58 from Apple II Madden. The right side offensive plays 16, 19, 41, 48, and 58
from Sega Madden. The other plays showed represented in demonstrative exhibit 476 showed
similar patterns.

138

See id. at 1377-1382.
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Figure 5
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Barr also testified to the presence of various misspellings and distinctive character strings from
the source code for Apple II Madden that show up in Sega Madden source code. 139
Regarding later versions of Sega Madden, Barr testified that the plays in 1990 Sega, derived
from Apple II Madden, were also found in subsequent Sega versions. 140 Barr illustrated this point
by walking through an example of a play from 1995 Sega Madden, demonstrating how plays
persisted from Apple II Madden to 1995 Sega Madden. 141 Barr also testified that he found no
evidence that subsequent versions of Sega Madden ever eliminated plays used in both Apple II
Madden and 1990 Sega Madden. 142 He further noted that additional plays from Apple II Madden
were added to later Sega versions. 143
EA’s defense centered on the theme that Park Place independently developed Sega Madden
and the only reason for the similarity of the plays and formations was that Simmons used a
selection of plays from playbooks that Judge Breyer ruled unprotectable. EA’s lead counsel used
the following analogy to illustrate the point:
Let’s suppose two people have decided to do a painting of the Golden Gate Bridge.
Their paintings likely would look similar. And if you look at these two paintings they look
similar. There are differences, but they don’t look similar . . . because one copied the other’s
painting. They look similar because they are both painting the same thing, the Golden Gate
bridge.
In the same way, Jim Simmons and Robin Antonick used the plays that Trip Hawkins
wrote and implemented them into their game by writing source code. Jim Simmons had as
much right as Robin Antonick to use the plays in the Apple II playbook, just as one painter
has as much right as another to paint the Golden Gate bridge. 144
In his closing argument, Antonick’s lead counsel contended that the only plausible explanation
for Park Place’s rapid successful implementation of Sega Madden, its avoidance of inevitable
software bugs, the nearly identical play formations and player movement, the selection and
arrangement of plays and play names, and the telltale misspellings and other similarities with
Apple II Madden source code was that Simmons received and emulated Antonick’s code, play
data, and other granular details of Apple II Madden. 145
EA responded by reminding the jury of its Golden Gate bridge painting analogy to contend
that Simmons independently developed Sega Madden. 146 She emphasized that “[e]very single EA
witness who testified told you they did not see Mr. Antonick’s source code in connection with the
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See id. at 1384-1393.

140

See id. at 1397-1398.
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See id. at 1398-1399.
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See id. at 656, lines 13-25.

145

See id. at 2057-2085.
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See id. at 2107-2108.
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making of the Sega Madden game or any other game.” 147 She admonished the jury that “[i]n order
to find in favor of Mr. Antonick, you would have to find that each and every one of these witnesses
came in here, swore to tell the jury under penalty of perjury, and deliberately lied to you.” 148
Antonick’s counsel responded by paraphrasing an insight commonly attributed to C.S. Lewis
that “Integrity is what you do when no one is looking” 149 as the key to solving the puzzle. 150
The jury unanimously found for Antonick on the plays and formations element, finding that
there were substantial similarities in the source code for Apple II Madden and Sega Madden and
that Antonick had proven that all seven editions of Sega Madden under consideration (from 1990
to 1996), considered as a whole, were virtually identical to Apple II Madden. 151 The jury’s verdict
set the stage for a third phase focused on EA games released after 1996. Before undertaking that
process, the court turned its attention to post-trial motions.
F. Post-Trial Proceedings: Judgment for EA as a Matter of Law
EA filed a motion pursuant to Rule 50 to overturn both of the jury’s verdicts—statute of
limitations and breach of contract—as a matter of law. 152 Under Ninth Circuit law, “Judgment as
a matter of law is appropriate when the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, permits only one reasonable conclusion, which is contrary to the jury’s
verdict.” 153 The court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law only if “‘there is no
legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find for [the non-moving] party on that issue.’” 154
If, however, “‘there is such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to
support the jury’s conclusion,’” the motion should be denied. 155 When considering a motion for
judgment as a matter of law, the court may not make credibility determinations, weigh the
evidence, or substitute its own view of the evidence for the jury’s. 156
Notwithstanding the high threshold for overturning a jury verdict, Judge Breyer granted EA’s
motion with respect to the jury’s breach of contract determination. 157 The court drew heavily on
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See Trial Transcript, supra note 78, at 2129, lines 19-20.
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See Special Verdict Form, Antonick v. Electronic Arts Inc., 3:11-cv-01543-CRB (N.D. Cal.) (filed Jul. 23,
2013), 2013 WL 9768250; Beth Winegarner, EA Owes ‘Madden NFL’ Coder $3.6M in Royalties, Jury Finds, LAW360
(Jul. 23, 2013), https://www.law360.com/articles/459582.
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Hagen v. City of Eugene, 736 F.3d 1251, 1256 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc.,
127 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 1997)).
154
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its pretrial ruling that Apple II Madden was only entitled to thin protection and hence Sega Madden
would only constitute a derivative work “if an ordinary reasonable observer comparing Apple II
Madden as a whole to Sega Madden as a whole would consider the works virtually identical.” 158
While acknowledging that Antonick identified a broad range of similarities, Judge Breyer
concluded that “Antonick does not point to any evidence of the works ‘as a whole.’” 159 The court
noted that “Barr’s opinion that all seven Sega Madden games are “essentially the same” as a whole
cannot substitute for the jury’s subjective comparison of each of the seven Sega Madden games as
a whole to Apple II Madden as a whole.” 160
The court based this conclusory statement on the limitation on expert opinion first announced
in Krofft:
Because the intrinsic test requires the perspective of an ordinary, reasonable observer,
Funky Films, Inc. [v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P. 462 F.3d 1072,] 1077 [(9th Cir.
2006)], expert testimony is not admissible evidence of similarity for purposes of the
intrinsic test. See, e.g., Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 1446, 1448–49 (9th Cir.
1988) (stating that expert testimony is appropriate under the extrinsic test, but not under
the intrinsic test); Express, LLC v. Fetish Grp., Inc., 424 F.Supp.2d 1211, 1228 (C.D.Cal.
2006) (“While expert testimony is generally appropriate in conducting the extrinsic test,
expert testimony may not be considered in conducting the intrinsic test.”) (internal citation
omitted); Trust Co. Bank v. Putman Publ’g Grp., Inc., No. CV 87 07393 AHS(JRX), 1988
WL 62755, at *6 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 4, 1988) (“Expert testimony is inadmissible on this
intrinsic test.”).10
________________________________
10

See also Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713 (2d Cir.1992) (“[E]xpert
testimony may be used to assist the fact finder in ascertaining whether the defendant had copied any part of
the plaintiff's work. . . . However, once some amount of copying has been established, it remains solely for
the trier of fact to determine whether the copying was ‘illicit’. . . . Since the test for illicit copying is based
upon the response of ordinary lay observers, expert testimony is thus ‘irrelevant’ and not permitted.”)
(citations omitted). 161

Funky Films, Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., and Trust Co. Bank v. Putman Publ’g Grp., Inc.
rely on Krofft’s questionable standard. 162 These decisions don’t address whether experts should be
permitted to translate technical computer design and coding into a form that a jury can comprehend
for the purposes of comparing works written in different computer languages.
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See Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P., 462 F.3d 1072, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing
Krofft); Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 1446, 1448–49 (9th Cir. 1988) (same); Trust Co. Bank v. Putman
Publ’g Grp., Inc., No. CV 87 07393 AHS(JRX), 1988 WL 62755, at *5-*6 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 4, 1988).
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It is particularly unnerving to see the court’s reliance in footnote 10 on Altai, which expressly
permitted the use of expert witnesses in software copyright cases for the very purpose of enabling
lay judges and juries to surmount the task of making the illicit copying determination. 163 Had Judge
Breyer continued reading the Altai decision following the excerpt he quoted in footnote 10, he
would have seen that the Second Circuit carefully explained why it was departing from traditional
expert witness rule for computer software cases.
Historically, Arnstein’s ordinary observer standard had its roots in “an attempt to apply
the ‘reasonable person’ doctrine as found in other areas of the law to copyright.” 3 NIMMER
§ 13.03[E][2], at 13–62.10–11. That approach may well have served its purpose when the
material under scrutiny was limited to art forms readily comprehensible and generally
familiar to the average lay person. However, in considering the extension of the rule to the
present case, we are reminded of Holmes’ admonition that, “[t]he life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience.” O.W. Holmes, Jr., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
Thus, in deciding the limits to which expert opinion may be employed in ascertaining
the substantial similarity of computer programs, we cannot disregard the highly
complicated and technical subject matter at the heart of these claims. Rather, we recognize
the reality that computer programs are likely to be somewhat impenetrable by lay
observers—whether they be judges or juries—and, thus, seem to fall outside the category
of works contemplated by those who engineered the Arnstein test. Cf. Dawson v. Hinshaw
Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 737 (4th Cir.) (“departure from the lay characterization is
warranted only where the intended audience possesses ‘specialized expertise’”), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990). As Judge Pratt correctly observed:
In the context of computer programs, many of the familiar tests of similarity
prove to be inadequate, for they were developed historically in the context of artistic
and literary, rather than utilitarian, works.
Computer Assocs., 775 F.Supp. at 558.
In making its finding on substantial similarity with respect to computer programs, we
believe that the trier of fact need not be limited by the strictures of its own lay perspective.
See Dawson, 905 F.2d at 735; Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1233; Broderbund, 648 F.Supp. at 1136
(stating in dictum: “an integrated test involving expert testimony and analytic dissection
may well be the wave of the future in this area. . . .”); Brown Bag Software, 960 F.2d at
1478–79 (Sneed, J., concurring); see also 3 NIMMER § 13.03[E][4]; but see Brown Bag
Software, 960 F.2d at 1475 (applying the “ordinary reasonable person” standard in
substantial similarity test for computer programs). Rather, we leave it to the discretion of
the district court to decide to what extent, if any, expert opinion, regarding the highly
technical nature of computer programs, is warranted in a given case.
In so holding, we do not intend to disturb the traditional role of lay observers in judging
substantial similarity in copyright cases that involve the aesthetic arts, such as music, visual
works or literature.

163

See, supra, text accompanying notes 41-44.
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In this case, [MIT Computer Science Professor] Dr. Davis’ opinion was instrumental
in dismantling the intricacies of computer science so that the court could formulate and
apply an appropriate rule of law. While Dr. Davis’ report and testimony undoubtedly shed
valuable light on the subject matter of the litigation, Judge Pratt remained, in the final
analysis, the trier of fact. The district court's use of the expert's assistance, in the context of
this case, was entirely appropriate. 164
Similarly, in the Antonick trial, Barr’s testimony and demonstrative exhibits were “instrumental
in dismantling the intricacies of computer science so that the court could formulate and apply an
appropriate rule of law.” 165 Since Altai was a bench trial, Judge Pratt stood in the jury’s shoes.
To make matters worse, faithful application of Rule 50(b) dictated affirmance of the jury’s
liability determination. Judge Breyer should have credited the jury’s assessment of both
circumstantial and direct evidence, just as he instructed. 166 In conjunction with the extensive
circumstantial evidence that Simmons used Antonick’s code to complete Sega Madden, Barr’s
testimony enabled the jury to understand the binary play data and many other technical aspects of
video game programming necessary for lay jurors to evaluate the questions before it. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Antonick, including credibility determinations, should have
led to affirmance on the ground that the jury concluded, as Antonick argued, that Simmons
faithfully emulated the Apple II Madden play data in writing Sega Madden source code and that
subsequent editions of Sega Madden reproduced the derived code. 167 Thus, it is difficult to see
how Judge Breyer did not usurp the jury’s role.
G. Ninth Circuit Appeal: Recognition, Affirmance, and Expansion of the “Nutty” Rule
While it was astounding to see the district court so badly misinterpret copyright jurisprudence
in its pretrial rulings, misapply the Rule 50(b) standard in its post-trial ruling, and misread Altai in
overturning the jury’s verdict, surely the Ninth Circuit would correct the errors. It seemed
inconceivable that the Ninth Circuit would not distinguish software code cases from cases
involving works that are readily perceptible to lay fact-finders as regards the admissibility of expert
testimony, as all of the circuits to consider the issue had, 168 or, at a minimum, call for en banc
reconsideration of Krofft, at least with regard to computer software copyright cases, as Judge Sneed
had intimated. 169
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Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713-14 (2d Cir.1992).
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See id. at 714.
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Antonick’s opening appellate brief squarely presented the errors, 170 including the argument
that EA waived its Rule 50(b) argument regarding insufficiency of the evidence of virtual identity
of the works as a whole by failing to preserve the issue. 171 EA’s opposition echoed the “thin”
copyright arguments that it used to mislead the district court in its pretrial rulings—namely that
competitors are free to independently develop competing video games—even though this case
involved alleged sequels developed with full access to the underlying source code and design
documents. 172 The jury ruled that Simmons did not independently develop Sega Madden based on
ample evidence.
EA also argued that Antonick’s complaint must fail because “[a] copyright plaintiff cannot
establish that one work infringes another without proving the content of the two works so that they
can be compared.” 173 Although EA failed to produce the final source for Apple II Madden,
Antonick located and produced original drafts of source code, data files, and design documents for
Apple II Madden that enabled Michael Barr to provide the jury with comparisons of the Apple II
Madden and Sega Madden design and code bases that could be understood by laypeople. Barr
explained similarities in, among other things, selection and expression of plays and formations,
ordering and numbering of plays, player ratings, nonstandard and disproportionate field width,
names of plays and variables, and misspellings that were unlikely to occur absent copying of
Antonick’s code by Park Place. 174 EA also sought to revive its statute of limitations defense, which
the jury rejected in the phase 1 trial 175 and Judge Breyer upheld in his post-trial ruling. 176
At oral argument on March 16, 2016, 177 Judges Andrew Kleinfeld, Johnnie Rawlinson, and
Andrew Hurwitz launched into the statute of limitations defense. Drawing on his experience
programming computers decades earlier, 178 Judge Kleinfeld suggested—contrary to the stipulation
at trial, the significant differences between the Apple II and Sega Genesis platforms, and the
testimony of software experts from both sides—that “it’s inconceivable that a game developer
would not notice that his game had been copied until many years later when there was an
anniversary special. You would think that he’d been playing football games.” 179 Judge Kleinfeld

170
See Appellant’s Brief, Antonick v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 14-15298 (filed Aug. 1, 2014), 2014 WL 3909266
(C.A.9) (Appellate Brief).
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See Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a party may not seek a
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See Appellee’s Brief, Antonick v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 14-15298 (filed Nov. 14, 2014), 2014 WL 3909266
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then opined that “when you have written a computer program, you can usually tell something about
the technique of how it was created even though you can’t tell the details just as if you know some
other craft, traditional dark room photography, you can make a pretty good judgment about how a
particular effect was produced. Now you can’t do it for sure until you have disassembled the code,
but if you have a big economic interest, one would think that you would.” 180 The parties’
stipulation 181 and trial record contradicted Judge Kleinfeld’s assertion. 182
Shortly thereafter, Judge Kleinfeld pursued his hunch that it would have been easy for
Antonick to have disassembled the Sega Madden code to determine whether it was copied from
Apple II Madden offered his opinion that the 68000 microprocessor used in the Sega Genesis is a
descendent of the 6502 microprocessor used in the Apple II. 183 As Antonick’s counsel pointed out,
EA had not pursued that issue. 184 More to the point, as software experts for both sides testified,
disassembling the video games at issue from the object code was very difficult. 185 As a result of
this digression—in which a Ninth Circuit judge who had programed some code for a more
primitive microprocessor in the early 1980s offered his own opinions about microprocessors and
disassembly—nearly half of Antonick’s oral argument time was gone. 186
When the argument turned to the role of expert witnesses in software copyright cases, Judge
Hurwitz stated:
The brief from [Antonick’s] side says that in the 9th Circuit expert testimony is allowed on
the extrinsic, on the intrinsic test. I find I don’t know eight, nine, ten cases, some involving
computer code, in our circuit saying no it’s not. Who’s right? And let me preface this by
saying that I think that’s a nutty rule if it is our rule. But my question is: Is that our rule? 187
After Antonick’s counsel responded there was room for doubt as to the Ninth Circuit’s rule, Judge
Hurwitz responded: “You don’t have to convince me that that’s [the Krofft rule] is wrong in terms
of policy, but you’ll have to convince eleven judges on the court to call it en banc.” 188
Since the Ninth Circuit clearly permits expert testimony of the extrinsic aspect of the copyright
infringement test, the court then delved into how the role of experts works in practice:
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Id. at 1:33- 2:06.
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See Trial Transcript, supra note 78, at 1953 (Stipulated fact number 37: “Playing or viewing a John Madden
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Judge Hurwitz: [The Ninth Circuit has] cases in which we have specifically said that you
cannot use expert testimony on the intrinsic side of the test. And I
understand that we have generally said we think that the Second Circuit
is smarter than us and does a better job. I’ll take that. My question is: Is
there any case in which we have said, and because we’ve been so dumb
in the past that we do allow testimony on the intrinsic standard.
David Nimmer (Antonick’s Copyright Appellate Counsel): Your Honor, I don’t have a
citation to a case that says “we have been dumb in the past,” however
Judge Hurwitz: [chuckling] Try the second part, OK [laughter]
David Nimmer: I do have the past experience of Ninth Circuit cases and there is no case in
which the jury has been asked unaided by expert testimony to simply code
for non-literal copying.
Judge Rawlinson: But the expert testimony is on the extrinsic test, isn’t it? Not the intrinsic
David Nimmer: Nominally it is on the extrinsic test.
Judge Kleinfeld: Can Ninth Circuit law be read to mean that you don’t need, and therefore
cannot use, an expert to say that the two expressions look alike, but you
may well need and can use an expert to say whether the source code is
alike?
David Nimmer: I think that is one possibility your Honor.
Judge Rawlinson: When you’re comparing the source code, would that be the intrinsic test
or the extrinsic test?
David Nimmer: Well, your Honor has identified exactly the problem, and then the dilemma
in the context of software. There has been no case in which juries have
been asked to compare different source codes to find non-literal identity.
I think that the answer to the court’s collective question can be as follows:
How should the intrinsic test be applied? First of all, it’s obvious that
expert testimony needs to be admitted, and all cases in all circuits,
including the Ninth Circuit, have admitted expert testimony.
But then when the question comes to the jury, “jury make the intrinsic
test,” I could understand not allowing the expert to give his or her ultimate
opinion—“I believe that these are, that these express, the same idea, and
that’s my personal opinion.” The jury can be asked exactly the question
that EA poses in its own brief when it characterizes the intrinsic test on
page 33 [of its brief]. It says in effect that the intrinsic asks whether the
defendant took from plaintiff’s work so much of what is pleasing to the
work’s intended audience that the defendant wrongfully appropriated
something which belongs to the plaintiff, quoting Cavalier v. Random
House, a case involving children’s books.
That’s a question that after expert testimony has been admitted, the jury
can make in its determination, in its subjective consideration as the voice
38

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3632082

of the community. And that is not precisely what happened here because
Judge Breyer framed the jury instruction.
Judge Hurwitz: If we disagree with you and find that Mr. Barr’s testimony is not admissible
on the intrinsic side of the equation, is there any other evidence that
shows, that would satisfy the intrinsic part of the test?
David Nimmer: OK, let’s take that step by step here you Honor. Mr. Barr’s testimony,
we’re going to imagine, is admissible because it illuminates the extrinsic
test.
Judge Hurwitz: Right.
David Nimmer: Now the jury in its sole discretion has to apply the intrinsic test. The jury
has to determine, OK now that we’ve heard the testimony and we’ve heard
the defense and we’ve heard the cross-examination, did EA take so much
of what is pleasing to the work’s intended audience that it wrongfully
appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff? That is a test the
jury can make in its subjective determination based on all of the evidence
that it has heard in the case.
Judge Hurwitz: Even in the absence of the code being in evidence?
David Nimmer: Absolutely. In the presence of the code being in evidence, nothing is added
except confusion to the jury. Let’s imagine that the code was added.
Judge Kleinfeld: I can’t see that. I mean, even a layman can compare what may be
meaningless instruction in the code. It would be like reading two texts that
are in a foreign language and having no idea what the text means but being
able to see that its the same characters.
David Nimmer: Your Honor, this court has said in the case of Swirsky that when music is
copied not identically, we need expert testimony. And to quote the
Swirsky Ninth Circuit opinion, “Any person untrained in music could
conclude that 2-2-2-2-2-1-2-1-3 did not match 2-2-4-3-2-3.” It’s the same
in this case. Any person could conclude that the 0-0-0-1-0-0 does not
match 1-0-0-1-1-0. If that was the standard, no expert testimony would be
needed and the case would end immediately. There would be no such
thing as non-literal copying in the Ninth Circuit if that were the standard.
Swirsky assures us that that is not the standard. That extrinsic testimony
from an expert, a musicologist in that case, is needed.
In this case, expert testimony is needed from someone who is expert in
the field of computer software. And that is the testimony that was given.
At the end of the day, the jury can make its own intrinsic determination:
Did the defendant cross the line? Did the defendant appropriate so much
from the work that is pleasing to its intended evidence that it crossed over
the line? 189

189

Id. at 28:40-34:13.
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During its argument, EA pressed the importance of the jury directly comparing the works at
issue. 190 In response, Judge Kleinfeld remarked “If I were a juror, I would really want an expert,
because it is too boring to go across each line and compare. My eyes glaze over . . . 191 Judge
Hurwitz then concluded that
our rule baffles me on this topic for the same reason that Judge Kleinfeld just said which
is that the case law seems to say that the ordering and sequence of coding is also part of
the copyrightable protectable material and certainly having somebody say they not only
read the same number but the sequence makes some difference I think makes some sense
to me, but, you know, I don’t make the rules here, I just follow them. 192
Despite that bafflements, on November 22, 2016, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
ruling that Antonick’s claim failed as a matter of law. 193 Without addressing the district court’s
flawed pretrial rulings—severely narrowing Antonick’s derivative work claim and improperly
requiring “virtual identity” of the works as a whole—the appellate court concluded that the
plaintiff’s failure to place the full source code of both games into evidence made it impossible for
the jury to compare the works as a whole. 194
The court placed primary reliance on Seiler v. Lucasfilm, Ltd.,195 which held based on the best
evidence rule 196 that “[t]here can be no proof of ‘substantial similarity’ and thus of copyright
infringement unless Seiler’s works are juxtaposed with Lucas’ and their contents compared.” 197 In
Seiler, the district judge “found that Seiler had lost or destroyed the originals in bad faith under
Fed.R.Evid. 1004(1) and denied admissibility of any secondary evidence.” 198
The circumstances could not have been more different in Antonick, yet the Ninth Circuit does
not make any effort to apply the clear exceptions to the best evidence rule. Rule 1003 provides that
“[a] duplicate is admissible to the same extent as the original unless a genuine question is raised
about the original's authenticity or the circumstances make it unfair to admit the duplicate.” Rule
1004 provides that
An original is not required and other evidence of the content of a writing, recording, or
photograph is admissible if:
(a) all the originals are lost or destroyed, and not by the proponent acting in bad faith;
(b) an original cannot be obtained by any available judicial process;
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(c) the party against whom the original would be offered had control of the original;
was at that time put on notice, by pleadings or otherwise, that the original would be a
subject of proof at the trial or hearing; and fails to produce it at the trial or hearing; or
(d) the writing, recording, or photograph is not closely related to a controlling issue.
The defendant EA was the copyright owner and remarkably failed to locate original copies of
the Madden games, a product that earned EA billions of dollars. Furthermore, Antonick assembled
a near complete copy of the Apple II Madden source code and design documents and the parties
were able to provide the jury with a rich understanding of how Apple II Madden and Sega Madden
compared. 199 As the First Circuit recognized, “if the Best Evidence Rule is satisfied, evidence
other than the original may be sufficient to establish the content of a copyrighted work.” 200
The other cases cited by the Ninth Circuit focus on the insufficiency of the evidence to prove
copyright infringement. 201 Yet Antonick brought a breach of contract case which turned in part on
the Copyright Act’s definition of “derivative work.” The pertinent question was whether it was
more likely than not that EA breached its obligation to pay royalties on derivative works as defined
by the contract. Antonick provided a wealth of direct and circumstantial evidence to prove that
Sega Madden constituted a derivative work of Apple II Madden as “derivative work” is defined
by the contract.
The Ninth Circuit’s rejection of Antonick’s appeal turned on the infamous “nutty” rule 202 and
two conclusory assertions. First, that the evidence presented at trial “at most demonstrates access
and a possible motive to copy” overlooks the extensive trial record. That record, as explored
above 203 and to which the court is required to view in the light most favorable to Antonick,
provided the jury ample grounds for finding that EA did not merely copy unprotectable ideas. The
jury was entitled to believe substantial evidence showing that under impossibly tight time-tomarket pressure, EA and its inexperienced programmer took shortcuts—copying substantial
amounts of protectable design and coding elements—to complete in three months what Antonick’s
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See Barr Report, supra note 93, Ex. B (noting that he considered: Mr. Antonick’s source code files, as produced
on a set of floppy disks labeled as A0001, A0004-06, A0023-24, A0035, A0037-38, A0045-47, A0049, A0054-55,
and A0058-66; Source code and technical files recovered from floppy disks (RA0003937); 22 optical disks produced
by EA on which he identified source code for eight distinct versions of Madden football games for Sega Genesis and
Super Nintendo; and four floppy disks from Park Place).
200

Airframe Sys., Inc. v. L-3 Commc’s. Corp., 658 F.3d 100, 107 n.9 (1st Cir. 2011).

201
See 841 F.3d at 1066 (citing Airframe Sys., Inc. v. L–3 Commc’ns Corp., 658 F.3d 100, 107 (1st Cir. 2011)
(“Having presented no evidence sufficient to prove the content of its registered source code versions, Airframe cannot
show that any of its registered works is substantially similar to the allegedly infringing M3 program.”); Gen. Universal
Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 146 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (“Without providing its own source code for
comparison, GUS did not satisfy the requirement that the infringed and infringing work be compared side-by-side.”);
Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1988) (granting JMOL to copyright defendant because
no reasonable jury could have found substantial similarity)).
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“[O]ur law is clear that expert testimony cannot satisfy a plaintiff’s burden of proof under the intrinsic test,
which “‘depend[s] on the response of the ordinary reasonable person.’” Antonick, 841 F.3d at 1067 (citing Brown
Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1475 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods.,
Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977)) (footnote omitted)).
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See, supra, text accompanying notes 120-43.
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experienced team had taken four years to do. EA was caught with its hands in the protectable
expression cookie jar. They did not merely take unprotectable ideas—they raided the jar.
Second, the Ninth Circuit commented that “the lay testimony was about how the games
appeared, not how they were coded—and Antonick does not assert a copyright interest in Apple
II Madden’s audiovisual appearance, only in its coding.” Yet the jury was presented with
significant evidence about that coding. 204 The fact that a software expert presented the evidence—
of play data and other source code elements—in no way negates the fact that the jury saw actual
code. The Ninth Circuit in effect expanded the nuttiness of the “nutty” rule. The colloquy with
Professor Nimmer about how to interpret the “nutty” rule sensibly 205 was for naught.
H. En Banc and Certiorari Petitions: Denied
The Ninth Circuit’s Antonick decision offfered a glimmer of hope for rectifying the “nutty”
rule:
Antonick is not alone in contending that experts should be allowed to help juries assess the
holistic similarity of technical works such as computer programs. See Brown Bag, 960 F.2d
at 1478 (Sneed, J., concurring); Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713
(2d Cir. 1992). But, given our precedents, that argument must be addressed to an en banc
court. 206
Antonick decided to take a shot at rectifying the “nutty” rule. 207 Although en banc review is
difficult to obtain,208 several factors weighed in Antonick’s favor. 209 The Ninth Circuit panel
acknowledged that the applicability of the Krofft rule to software code cases was controversial and
in conflict with the law in another circuit. It is, in fact, in conflict with the law of multiple circuits—
all that have confronted the issue. 210 Moreover, the computer software industry is of tremendous
economic significance to the U.S. economy in general and states within the Ninth Circuit. The
Ninth Circuit sees a large portion of software copyright cases.
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See, supra, text accompanying notes 128-43.
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See 9th Circuit Oral Argument, supra note 177, at 29:30-34:13.
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841 F.3d at 1067, n.4
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Antonick v. Electronic Arts Inc., No 14-15298, Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc (filed Jan. 6, 2017),
available at
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See Peter S. Menell & Ryan Vacca, Revisiting and Confronting the Federal Judiciary Capacity “Crisis”:
Charting a Path for Federal Judiciary Reform, 108 CAL. L. REV. ___, ____ (2020) (reporting that the Ninth Circuit
granted between 1.26% and 2.17% of en banc petitions in the years 2013-17).
209

See Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Ninth Circuit Rules, Rule 35(b)(1)(B) (noting that en banc petitions
must begin with a statement that “the proceeding involves one or more questions of exceptional importance, each of
which must be concisely stated; for example, a petition may assert that a proceeding presents a question of exceptional
importance if it involves an issue on which the panel decision conflicts with the authoritative decisions of other United
States Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue”).
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See, supra, Part II.
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The Ninth Circuit unfortunately declined the petition. All of the panel members, despite having
written that the “argument must be addressed to an en banc court,” voted against review. 211 They
might have considered the expert witness issue unnecessary to resolving the Antonick case because
of the best evidence ruling—which was also wrong, 212 although perhaps not nutty.
With time running down in the fourth quarter, Antonick opted to take a final Hail Mary 213 at
the U.S. Supreme Court. 214 The circuit split could not have been more clear and significant. Alas,
the Supreme Court also declined review, 215 bringing this saga to a disconcerting end.
V. Rectifying the Ninth Circuit’s Nutty Rule
The Antonick cases reads like a tragedy of errors, a Dickensian tale for the digital age. 216 Robin
Antonick entered into a contract with EA to produce the first realistic football video game, a
product that would revolutionize the sports video game industry. His contracts with EA shared the
risks. Antonick was paid modestly to produce the game with the prospect of a share of future
proceeds from his game and derivative works as defined in the contract if the game succeeded.
Antonick saw some of that return from Apple II Madden, but was allegedly misled into believing
that the follow-on Madden games were not derived from his design and source code. When he
discovered that he might have been defrauded, he brought suit and painstakingly gathered
extensive evidence that enabled him to get to trial. Notwithstanding flawed pretrial rulings that
severely restricted his allegations, the jury found in his favor, only to have the district judge
overturn the verdict based on questionable application of the Rule 50(b) standard and wooden
application of a truly “nutty” rule: that expert witnesses cannot be used to aid lay judges and juries
in deciphering and analyzing computer source code. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit panel overlooked
the serious flaws in the district court’s handling of the case, misapplied the best evidence rule, and
exacerbated the nuttiness of the “nutty” rule. The larger Ninth Circuit declined to take up the clear
circuit split and the Supreme Court left the national law on the use of expert witnesses in software
copyright cases fragmented. Notwithstanding the massive resources devoted to this matter, the
judicial system failed to render a coherent or just resolution.
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See 14-15298 Robin Antonick v. Electronic Arts, Inc. “Order Filed (From Chambers),” filed Mar. 16, 2017
(“Judges Rawlinson and Hurwitz voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc, and Judge Kleinfeld so
recommended. The full court was advised of the petition for rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a vote on
whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35. The petition for rehearing en banc is denied.”).
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See, supra, text accompanying notes 195-200.
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This is drawn from offensive play 99 in Apple II Madden. See Figure 1, supra.
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See Antonick v. Electronic Arts Inc., No 17-168 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 2017) (filed Jul. 28, 2017); Petition for Writ of
Certiorari; Antonick v. Electronic Arts Inc., No 17-168 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 2017), Reply Brief for Petitioner (filed Oct. 11,
2017).
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138 S.Ct. 422 (2017).
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See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 3 (1853). Sadly, Antonick is not the only digital age BLEAK HOUSE.
See Peter S. Menell, API Copyrightability Bleak House: Unraveling and Repairing the Oracle v. Google Jurisdictional
Mess, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1515 (2016).
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More than four decades ago, and before Congress extended copyright law to protect computer
software, 217 the Ninth Circuit ruled that expert testimony was inadmissible to determine whether
Mayor McCheese and the merry band of McDonaldland characters infringed copyright protection
for Wilhelmina W. Witchiepoo and the other imaginative H.R. Pufnstuf costumed characters.218
While this judge-made rule made sense in dealing with works that are directly perceivable by lay
judges and jurors, it clearly makes no sense when applied to hexadecimal assembly code for
different processors. Although the injustice to Robin Antonick cannot unfortunately be rectified,
there remains an urgent need to correct the “nutty” rule that derailed his case and threatens to
wreak havoc in future software copyright litigation in the Ninth Circuit.
It is perplexing that Ninth Circuit judges could not see, as judges in other circuits have, the
simple path of distinguishing software cases based on the obvious limitations of lay judges and
jurors in comprehending the foreign languages of source code. Since the emergence of software
copyright infringement cases in the 1980s, substantially all software copyright cases have
employed expert witnesses to aid juries in understanding software code. As the Second Circuit
wisely recognized in Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. 219 the ordinary observer standard
“may well have served its purpose when the material under scrutiny was limited to art forms readily
comprehensible and generally familiar to the average lay person,” but as to computer programs,
district courts must have “discretion . . . to decide to what extent, if any, expert opinion, regarding
the highly technical nature of computer programs, is warranted in a given case.” 220
The time is long past due for the Ninth Circuit, home to many of the most important software
companies and the most significant software copyright cases, 221 to take the Krofft expert testimony
rule en banc. Short of that, the Supreme Court should either grant certiorari in a case raising this
issue or simply remand such a case to the Ninth Circuit for en banc review. Although this issue
should not require legislation, that remains an option to rectify and harmonize the national law on
this important issue.
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The Copyright Act of 1976, which went in effect on January 1, 1978, included computer software in the class
of “literary works.” See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1); Menell, supra note 37, at 315-18 (discussing Congress’s vexed
compromise to include computer software, written work that serves functional purposes, within the copyright system).
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See Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
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982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992),
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Id. at 713.

221

See, e.g., Cisco Systems Inc v. Arista Networks, Inc, 2016 WL 4440239 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Oracle America,
Inc. v. Google Inc., 847 F.Supp.2d 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 750 F.3d 1339
(Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 2887 (2015), on remand, 2016 WL 3181206 (N.D. Cal. 2016), 2016 WL
5393938 (N.D. Cal. 2016), rev’d, 886 F.3d 1179 (2018), cert. granted, Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., 140 S.Ct.
520 (2019); Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
799 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 35 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994).
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